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Abstract 
 The Blue Dog Coalition is an informal organization of legislators within the 
House of Representatives that strives to influence policy on fiscal responsibility, attract 
the attention of the electorate, and hone the various lawmaking skills of its members.  
They are a group that elicits wide range of reactions covering the length of the political 
spectrum, but despite this, their claims of special defense of fiscal conservatism within 
the Democratic Party have gone relatively undocumented by the academic community. 
 This project has integrated a party literature with a caucus literature, in the 
attempt of building a novel framework for research.  Work on polarization, the 
significance of parties, the purpose and history of caucuses all have been fused in such a 
way that the Blue Dogs have created an opportunity to test broad congressional questions 
on a caucus-microcosm scale.  Three important questions have emerged from the many 
possible avenues of exploration on the topic:  How does admission into the Blue Dog 
Coalition effect voting behavior — measured by interest, ideology, and party unity 
scores?  How does party leadership delegate prestigious committee assignments, a 
traditional indicator of partisan favor and influence, towards Blue Dogs?  Can we use the 
Blue Dog Coalition as an indicator of fiscal conservatism? 
 To each of these questions, a number of interesting results emerged.  Blue Dogs, 
in the 104th scored higher in conservative interest group scores, more towards the center 
in ideological methods, and lower in party unity measurements.  Over time, the Blue 
Dogs began to behave closer to their Democratic counterparts.  In addition, membership 
on these select committees rose from a very small number to greater proportional parity 
within the Democratic Party.  Perhaps most interesting, the Blue Dog Coalition does 
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behave as a significant, independent predictor effect on NTU scores, a variable used to 
demonstrate fiscal conservatism. 
 This research has shown, first and foremost, that it is useful and practical to apply 
old arguments within the party literature to a smaller, caucus level of analysis that is 
relatively untouched by the political science field.  For the Blue Dogs, specifically, we 
have tested the validity of their claims in an attempt to reach broader questions of 
democratic responsibility and electoral clarity.  This work, and other work I have drawn 
upon, has barely scratched the surface on Blue Dog Democrats and other caucuses of 
comparable influence and popularity, and there remains a wealth of research material on 
this caucus alone to be explored by scholars in the field of congressional politics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On the surface, The Blue Dog Coalition (BDC) is only a small Democratic caucus 
of the House of Representatives, but the depths of this organization’s behavior has drawn 
fierce criticism and support from members of both political parties.  This group is a 
relatively new phenomenon to congressional politics, but its ability to attract attention to 
the cause of fiscal conservatism has quickly made their name brand a staple of 
contemporary policy debate.  Since 1995, the Blue Dogs have thrived in times of political 
polarization, garnering attention from individuals across the political spectrum. 
At times, Democrats speak of the BDC with exasperation.  They appear to be an 
obstructionist minority within a minority, stubbornly resisting progressive legislation for 
political gains (Suddath 2009).  In 2007, Rep. Lynn Woolsey (D-Calif.) made remarks 
that caused a stir within the Blue Dog camp, as she encouraged anti-war groups “to field 
primary challengers to any Democrat who does not vote,” along party lines, “to end the 
war” (Bresnahan 2010, 2/9/10).  The Democratic Party frequently experiences internal 
tension on controversial issues, and because the Blue Dog Coalition publicly disagrees 
with party leadership on issues pertinent to fiscal conservatism, that pressure is amplified 
in the caucus-party relationship.  
Often, Republicans will scoff at Blue Dog claims of fiscal responsibility, viewing 
the caucus as an exaggerated name brand constructed by vulnerable representatives 
(Loomis 2009, 6).  These individuals, to the GOP, are in the business of maintaining their 
own job and subsequently, their party’s majority in Congress.  Furthermore, they occupy 
highly contested seats making themselves vulnerable to primary challenges on the left 
and general election threats to the right.  Blue Dogs prosper by emerging from evenly 
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divided and politically moderate electoral districts, which makes them a glaring reminder 
of seats that could have been put towards the construction of a Republican majority. 
Public perception frequently falls along party lines, but to many proponents of 
Blue Dog Democracy, the caucus is a conservative counterweight to an otherwise liberal 
agenda (Lambro 1995).  To some, the caucus appears to be a tight-knit fraternity of 
pragmatists, and a “nonthreatening alternative to Republicans” (Suddath 2009).  The 
projection of the BDC as the rare bridge between two increasingly polarized political 
parties in the United States is to be either rejected or accepted by their electorate 
(Melancon 2009). When both camps are hotly divided, those left in the uncertain center 
attract the attention of those seeking to build a successful coalition of votes.  But how 
much of this has been the message put out by the media, or even the Blue Dogs 
themselves, and how much of this is reflective of real facts on the ground? 
It is time that political scientists devote attention to such sweeping claims of 
influence within Congress.  Through analysis of the 104th to the 110th Congress, I will 
examine the impact of the Blue Dogs on three fronts.  First, I will examine whether the 
caucus influences voting behavior of new members over time or merely reflects 
preexisting policy preferences.  Second, I will look for signs of Democratic leadership 
giving preference to Blue Dogs due to the importance of the organization within the 
Party.  Third, and finally, I will estimate the independent effect membership in the Blue 
Dog Coalition holds upon fiscal conservatism.  All of these questions will include 
analysis that takes into account change over time, as a framework to view all three sets of 
hypotheses. 
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These questions complement my argument that powerful caucuses in the House of 
Representatives, such as the Blue Dog Coalition, can be viewed as the next step in the 
division of Congressional labor.  As a party within a party, the informal and personalized 
characters of these institutions provide members with an opportunity to bend policy 
initiatives towards their individual and collective preference without having to obey the 
traditions and regulations of partisan hierarchy.  For this reason, the BDC presents an 
excellent case study for powerful caucuses in a polarized House. 
 
History and Description 
The purpose of the Blue Dog Coalition is twofold: name brand and policy group.  
The Blue Dogs are characterized by exclusive membership and policy focus on 
disciplined fiscal conservatism.  The organization is used as an ideological forum to 
connect with constituents, to hone leadership skills, and perfect policy expertise.  Some 
of this may stem from the context in which they emerged.  The Blue Dog Coalition 
formed in reaction to the increasingly strong, conservative leadership of Newt Gingrich 
and the Republican majority of the 104th Congress; a lack of opportunity for the few 
conservatives left in the Democratic Party also played a key role in its development.  
Legislation surrounding the deficit and debt, such as Pay As You Go (PAYGO), has 
become the trademark interests of these moderates, and through its rhetoric, the BDC 
demonstrates a belief that its unique position in the House can bring attention to long-
overlooked budgetary concerns. 
With members in every region of the country, the appeal of the Blue Dogs seems 
to fill the cracks of vulnerable, hotly contested congressional seats, thus giving leverage 
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and prestige to these members as “majority makers.” Their numbers are capped at twenty 
percent of the Democratic House Caucus; they have strict rules on mandatory voting 
unity (given a 2/3 majority in agreement) and a whip system to enforce the Caucus will 
(“Blue Dog Democrats” 2008). The exclusionary measures taken by instituting these 
formal measures (whips, rules, etc.) allow for a level of cohesiveness that many other 
moderate-to-conservative members are literally lining up to join – after being waitlisted 
and vetted. What began as 23 dissatisfied House Democrats meeting on an informal basis 
has grown to be a force of 52 moderates consistently consulted on the most monumental 
legislative proposals of our time.  
 The role of Blue Dogs in the U.S. House of Representatives during a shift in 
majority power makes for an interesting and valuable context for my research.  The 
Democratic-run 110th Congress provided an ideal end point for my range of research, 
creating a wide range of opportunities for Blue Dogs to show their behavioral character.  
Pelosi’s strong leadership offered an opportunity to observe Blue Dogs under a similar 
level of pressure from within their own party, rather than the opposing party.  The range 
of the 104th to 110th Congresses provides a spectrum of observation ranging from strong 
conservative to strong liberal majority leadership influence.  This time frame also allows 
us to watch the development of the caucus in its most crucial, beginning stages. 
 
Name: Ideology and Pragmatism 
The name “Blue Dog” is a construct of politicians seeking to better promote 
themselves and their interests.  The label was given to the caucus from the outside, and 
the unclear story of the group name’s origins reflects the dichotomy of ideology and 
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pragmatism.  In this sense, the Blue Dog name brand embodies the character of the group 
with relative efficiency. 
The first of two explanations emphasizes the role of ideology in the party.  
Accordingly, the name acknowledges an association with blind partisan loyalty by 
recalling the term for southern voters of the early 20th century who would rather support a 
mangy yellow dog than a Republican: the “Yellow Dog” Democrat.  The BDC, as 
cofounder Rep. John Tanner explains, are “yellow dogs … that have been choked by 
extremes in both political parties to the point they have turned blue” (Tanner BD Mission 
Statement, 29-30).  In reality, the ideology of the Blue Dog Coalition is much closer to 
the Southern “Boll Weevils” who voted with the GOP on tax and budgetary issues 
through much of the 1980s, but the Blue Dogs have unsurprisingly tried to avoid 
connection to this group and its negative, even destructive, connotation. 
This explanation is important for two reasons.  First, this account gives us some 
window into the way that BDC members view and present the purpose of the BDC 
through the construction of the caucus name brand.  Second, this version may offer some 
inclination as to what can be expected of the behavioral patterns of the organization.  
Acceptance of this narrative would seem to suggest that at the very roots of the caucus is 
an underlying agreement of political ideology. 
 Even among Blue Dogs, the name has been explained in different ways.  
Pragmatism is a key component of the Blue Dog appeal, and it cannot be divorced from 
their rhetoric of financial common sense.  The original meetings of the group took place 
in former Louisiana Representative Billy Tauzin’s office, which apparently had one of 
Cajun artist George Rodrigue’s famous Blue Dog paintings.  The image presented by this 
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accounting of the name’s origins is one of practicality.  Conservative Democrats had 
common interests.  They viewed the increasingly liberal Democratic Party as potentially 
dangerous for the country.  They did something about it.   
By claiming to have gathered out of necessity, to find some way of exerting 
influence over the dangerous reality of Congress at the time of their conception, the Blue 
Dogs take on a more pragmatic, businesslike approach.  Forgetting the lofty account of 
ideological clash, this story simply states that like the members of the BDC, the name 
was circumstantial, a product of the environment it was put into more than anything else. 
 
Geography: The Role of the South 
One thing does seem to transcend both renditions of the origins of the Blue Dogs: 
the influence of the South on the Blue Dog Coalition.  The Cajun art and allusions to past 
southern conservative Democrat coalitions make clear that there was, at the outset, a 
strong tie to the southern region of the United States if only in popular culture and 
historical reference.  This understanding can be supported by the percentage of Blue 
Dogs that represent districts in the South.  During the 104th Congress of 1995, the Blue 
Dogs’ first official legislative period as a caucus, 50% of the small group was Southern.  
Over the next fourteen years, a steady decrease in the percentage of Blue Dogs that 
represent Southern states took place.  By the 110th Congress, only 13 (30%) of the 43 
Blue Dogs represented Southern districts.   
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Testing the Significance of Southern Claims 
 Approximately 39.9% of Blue Dogs for the 104th-110th Congressional period were 
from Southern states.  In this sense, the parallels drawn to the Boll Weevil Democrats are 
relatively misguided.  The Democratic Party, as a whole, was approximately 23.25% 
Southern, and non-Blue Dogs were approximately 23.8% Southern.  By doing a chi-
square analysis, I can confidently say that the correlation between being a Blue Dog and 
being Southern is significant, and that Blue Dogs are more Southern than the Democratic 
Party as a whole, despite being a non-Southern in majority. 
 
(Table A) 
Column1 Not Southern Southern Total Significance 
Blue Dog 131 87 218  
Non-Blue Dog 1,004 257 1,261  
     
Total 1135 344 1,479 <0.001 
 
This affirmation of a substantially Southern character to the organization is 
significant in answering the question of preexisting homogeneity within the Blue Dog 
Coalition.  Whether it is for political survival or the natural fit of common viewpoints, the 
votes of these lawmakers are better understood in light of this Southern component.  
Certainly the shared geographic interests of bordering states may offer some sense of 
common interest and preference aside from any external exertion of pressure from BDC 
leadership, but the uninterrupted decline in southern percentage of the Coalition points to 
the possible importance of factors outside like-minded influence of Southern 
constituencies. 
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Numbers: The Growth of the Coalition 
During this time, the organization as a whole was growing rapidly, irrespective of 
region of the country.  At its founding in 1995, the Blue Dog Coalition consisted of 18 
members (8.9% of the Democratic minority).  During the following years leading up to 
the Democratic controlled 110th session, the Blue Dogs not only maintained but increased 
their raw size and percentage within the Democratic Caucus.  An uninterrupted rise from 
18 members in the 104th to 32 Blue Dogs in the 107th Congress to 43 Blue Dogs of the 
110th Congress amounted to a 9.6% expansion within the Democratic bloc of legislators.  
By 2007, roughly 18.5% of Democrats in the House of Representatives were Blue Dogs – 
conservatives who claimed to be at odds with the dominant ideological principles of the 
Democratic majority. 
  When nearly one in five partisans claim to be a different brand of Democrat, the 
importance of studying the actions and interactions of such a group is evident.  For the 
purpose of this research, these numbers directly relate to the second and third research 
questions.  The increase in sheer numbers will, presumably, affect the way that the 
leadership of the Democratic Party treats the BDC over time, and with the growth of 
physical presence in the House, efforts to maintain and advance unity on issues that Blue 
Dogs have championed as central to their name brand may prove to be more noticeable.  
 
Party Unity: Closing the Gap 
The message offered by Blue Dogs is one of principled resistance to issues that 
threaten fiscal responsibility and inflate the budget beyond what they deem to be 
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appropriate use of public funds, and in this light, they seem to be far from the ideal 
legislators to count on for party votes.  The numbers on party unity, if only in the 
beginnings of the BDC, support this assumption.  During the 104th Congress, Blue Dogs 
held a party unity score,1
 While the average Democrat (excluding Blue Dogs) continued to score higher 
each year on counts of party unity, the gap between the Blue Dogs and the rest of the 
Democratic Party began to close with each new session.  By the 110th, Blue Dogs scored 
89.85 on tests of party unity, compared to 97.06 scored by other Democrats.  This 
amounts to a gap of about 29 points in the 104th to a difference of only about 7 points in 
the 110th between the caucus and the rest of the Democratic Party.   Between the 109th 
and 110th sessions, a drastic decrease in disparities between the two groups occurs.  Thus, 
around the time of Democratic control of the House of Representatives, the Blue Dogs 
change from being over 14.48% below the non-BDC average to only half of that number.  
The steady increase in mean party unity scores for the Blue Dog Coalition may translate 
into a substantial realignment with party leadership over time.  This shift may be either a 
cause or effect of altered relations with party leadership over time, and is worth further 
examination. 
 on average, of 57.38, while non-Blue Dog Democrats averaged 
86.74.  By the 107th, Blue Dogs collectively averaged 71.63 and the rest of the 
Democratic Party held a mean score of 90.55.  Large discrepancies between these groups 
of Democrats continued from the 104th onward to the 110th, but it is important to note two 
growing trends. 
                                                 
1 The party unity score is a percentage of party-dividing votes on which the member of 
Congress supported his or her party leadership (Meinke, Codebook for House and Senate 
Voting Behavior Data Sets) 
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Tenure: An Indicator 
On average, Blue Dogs during the 104th-110th Congresses have served 4.02 terms; 
that is 2.44 terms less than non-Blue Dogs.  This may be due to the rapid expansion of the 
caucus, the tendency for more junior representatives to join caucuses, or the increase in 
Democratic power (and thus moderate districts won over by Democrats that are ready fits 
for the Blue Dog philosophy). The newer a member of Congress is to his or her position 
as legislator, the more likely he or she is to join a caucus (Miler 2008, 14).  This is done 
to increase channels into policy creation, raise publicity for members in vulnerable seats 
(or members lacking the incumbency benefits), and gain skills that more veteran 
lawmakers have achieved through committees.  In any case the Blue Dogs seem to have 
been, on average, elected to the House more recently than their non-Blue Dog 
counterparts.   
 
Concluding an Introduction 
The well-known dualism of members of the United States Congress helps us 
understand the motives of members as they join the Blue Dog Coalition.  Simply stated, a 
member of the House of Representatives, irrespective of any distinguishing 
characteristics, acts as a legislator and a campaigner (Davidson, Oleszek, and Lee, ch. 1).  
This reality is ever-present; it is the summary of political self-interest in our system, and 
it is a reflection of the basic duties to crafting new laws as well as the fundamental 
responsiveness necessary in full democracies.  Members of caucus are specialists, and as 
such, admission to organizations such as the Blue Dog Coalition signals the acquisition of 
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new, additional roles.  Blue Dog membership neatly links the two realms of 
responsibilities for members of Congress. 
Caucuses are sub-party units.  They operate within the confined boundaries of the 
American legislative branch and within the restrictive rules of their own party norms and 
regulations.  Over the last two decades, caucuses have grown in number, accumulated 
more significance, and established greater levels of autonomy.  Viewing caucuses as a 
party-within-a-party is appropriate in cases that demonstrate this greater autonomy and 
has the potential to yield greater understanding of the American political system as a 
whole. 
First, and perhaps most fundamental to the point of this project, I seek to answer a 
fundamental question of identity; are the Blue Dogs actually what they are made out to 
be?  Long after I began looking into this subject, and well into writing this thesis, I 
flipped open the dictionary to see if the term “Blue Dog Democrat” had made it to the 
level in popular knowledge that it was deemed worthy of an entry.  To my surprise, I 
found an entry concisely conjoining the “yellow-dog-choked-blue” beginnings of the 
organization with the Southern heritage.  In fact, by definition, Blue Dogs today are 
“Southern Conservative Democrats” (New Oxford American Dictionary 2005, 183). 
This was startling to me, because I had just summarized my limited data collected 
up to that point, and I was aware that at its highest point, the organization was never 
made up of a southern majority.  In truth, the average percent of Southerners in the Blue 
Dog ranks only amounted to roughly 38%.  The myth of Blue Dogs has already begun to 
settle into the realms of common knowledge, and the near absolute lack of scholarly 
attention given not only to caucuses, but Blue Dogs in particular, points to the need for 
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scholarship on congressional caucuses to keep pace with the increased significance of 
these subgroups. 
 Second, I argue that the Blue Dogs provide an opportunity to apply congressional 
theoretical debates to caucus level analysis.  In other words, the opportunity to test the 
BDC as a sub-party unit, by simply applying tests of party strength to the caucus, offers 
opportunities that exceed the results of my specific subject matter.  The Blue Dogs may 
indeed be one of a handful of fast growing caucuses that can best be viewed from a party-
within-a-party perspective, as I will show.  The only logical way of moving forward the 
topic of caucus research is putting it transparently next to the wealth of academic 
dialogue available for partisan theory, and exploring how they differ, how they interact, 
and how they can and should benefit from one another.  Caucuses and sub-party units 
impact American politics, and negligence on the subject means an incomplete view of our 
democratic system. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Polarization 
The Blue Dog Coalition has not escaped the enveloping polarized climate of 
modern American politics.  In fact, the centralizing, reshuffling, and radicalization of key 
components of the congressional system created the foundation on which the caucus 
could be built.  Without the contributing factor of polarization, the Blue Dogs would not 
threaten both the status quo of ideological divide between parties and the clarity that 
accompanies this neat cleavage between Republicans and Democrats. 
Parties have been polarizing for the last thirty-five years, and during this time, 
ideology-scoring methodology has developed enough to reflect this clear divergence 
between the two major parties in American politics.  The consequences of a growing 
ideological gap can be good and bad, ranging from clarity to legislative gridlock, as “the 
salience of party,” since 1980, “has increased by 48%” (Hetherington 2001, 620).  The 
reality of a divided legislature has affected both chambers equally in ways ranging from 
leadership relations to constituency services.  Following a period of ideological 
pellucidity, vividly demarcated lines on the political battleground have marked the 
lifetime of recent generations.  The electoral map has shown a conservative Republican 
southern United States and a liberal Democratic west and east coast.  The words 
conservative Democrat and liberal (or even moderate) Republican do not fit well into 
contemporary American political vernacular.   
Evidence of a growing divide between the Republican and Democratic Party is 
reliable and constant.  Theriault observes that, “Democrats representing these moderate 
constituencies in the mid 2000s have roll call records that are almost 25 percent more 
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liberal than the Democrats who represented moderate constituencies in the mid 1970s; 
Republicans in these districts vote 50 percent more conservatively than their 1970s 
counterparts” (Theriault 2008, 4).  In 1984, approximately half of the public could 
correctly place the political parties in their appropriate ideological points on a given 
spectrum; by 1990, this number increased by 13 percentage points--an additional 
indication of the widening gulf between the two major parties (Hetherington 2001, 623). 
While regional disparities and partisan levels of increased polarization may vary, 
the presence of an increasingly polar legislative branch stands on solid empirical ground.  
The Senate and House have equally polarized through the last three to four decades, 
showing a trend that probably has more to do with national shifting identities than 
institutional restructuring.  This change was lauded by political scientists from the 1950s 
to the 1980s as a movement towards national clarity- a tendency that would lead to more 
visible democratic responsibility (Ansolabehere, Snyder, Stewart 2001, 560).   
Now that this path to polarization is seemingly in full swing, a new threat of 
political gridlock, the ultimate stalemate in progressing legislative initiatives, has become 
a primary concern. Since 1990 political preferences have become further entrenched as 
“more than half of all congressional votes have featured a majority of one party opposing 
a majority of the other party.  This level of party polarization represents a steady increase 
over the 47 percent of such votes in the 1980s and 39 percent in the 1970s” (Jones 2001, 
125).  The swing to a hyper-divided governing body could crush essential actions under 
the weight of the political pressure that has developed and settled into every day 
obstruction of law making. 
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The catalysts behind increased polarization are essential to the understanding of 
how to deal with and interpret the ensuing effects of our present political climate- 
especially the role of political moderates.  Theriault offers a framework for observing and 
prioritizing sources of polarization at the national level.  Redistricting, extremism of party 
activism, procedural change and constituent sorting can neatly summarize the foundation 
necessary for the past 35 years of polarization (Theriault 2008, 50-51).  
Redistricting, or more to the point, gerrymandering, is a common motif that 
courses through the narrative of congressional ailments, yet a very serious debate over the 
weight that should be placed on redistricting as a cause of polarization continues.  
Theriault suggests, “that redistricting causes between 10 and 20 percent of the party 
polarization that has occurred in the House of Representatives in the past 32 years” 
(Theriault 2008, 83).  It is a factor, to be sure, but independent of similar influences, 
redistricting as a polarizing force does not stand up on its own legs.  The ability for 
politicians to manipulate the level of change in this variable has made the issue a media 
pundit favorite, but being widely loathed does not qualify redistricting as a core 
component of the polarization process.  For this reason, Theriault appropriately places 
redistricting at the bottom of a list of significant contributing factors. 
If redistricting is mildly over stated, then constituent sorting is significantly 
underemphasized. According to Theriault, “roughly one-third of the party polarization 
has come through the gradual adaptation of incumbents migrating to their parties’ 
ideological homes” (2008, 42).  This is an enormous shift.  Citizens of the United States 
of America today are voting more like their neighbors, producing safe districts in these 
regions of common ideology, which in turn lead to more liberal Democrats and more 
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conservative Republicans.  In light of the reshuffling that has pushed legislators further 
away from each other, the Blue Dogs, should their claims prove accurate, float uneasily 
in the growing void of would-be moderates as an anomaly defying the tendencies for 
members to essentially go extreme or go looking for a new job.   
 In conjunction with this effect, extreme party activism has become a factor that 
pushes members to polar ends beyond what their constituents pressure them to do. Some 
place “elite polarization at the heart of the explanation for party resurgence and 
hypothesize a set of causal dynamics between elites and ordinary Americans” 
(Hetherington 2001, 623).  This argument explains the role of political elites as leaders in 
indicating policy preference and political disposition.  “Mass behavior should reflect, at 
least to some degree, elite behavior.  Therefore, mass party strength should have 
increased as a result of greater partisanship at the elite level” (Hetherington 2001, 619).  
The relationship between the mass electorate and the political elites is an important one; 
in many ways the “behavior of the Republican and Democratic elite as the engine for an 
issue evolution” is the most complete analysis of the way information is trickled down to 
the public through these individuals (Hetherington 2001, 622).   
In other words, the political elites act as the indicating body of voters making this 
group a promising reflection of future congressional voting behavior.  Hetherington 
explains that 
If people are exposed to a heavily partisan stream of information, which 
will be more likely if elites are behaving in a partisan manner, then it 
follows that respondents will express opinions that reflect the heavily 
partisan stream.  Because greater ideological differences between the 
parties on the elite level should produce a more partisan information 
stream, elite polarization should produce a more partisan mass response. 
(Hetherington 2001, 622). 
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Party activists, members that would attend at least 3 party events or the national 
convention, have become more ideological in the post-reform congressional era.    As a 
result, the “would-be moderate candidates knew that surviving a primary dominated by 
ideologues was next to impossible” (Theriault 2008, 111).  So in response to the 
imminent danger of losing before the general election can even be had, members of 
Congress are casting increasingly ideological votes.  
 Thus party activists are pushing lawmakers to extreme points of ideological 
preference that may be well beyond the median of the political party.  “The lion’s share 
of polarization in both chambers is brought about by the growing ideological voting of 
members above and beyond their constituencies’ growing partisanship,” and this trend 
permeates through every corner of the nation, if more easily noticeable in the southern 
region of the country (Theriault 2008, 108).   For this reason Hetherington believes elite 
polarization is the heart of polarization and a resurgent centralized party; he argues a “set 
of causal dynamics between elites and ordinary Americans” (2001, 623). 
Two steps lead to the sorting process, then.  First, constituents become more 
homogeneous through geographic and ideological sorting, gerrymandering, and extreme 
party activism.  Heterogeneous districts similarly elect more polarized candidates, giving 
observers an “underlying cause of why rank and file members have ceded power to their 
party leaders” (Theriault 2008, 221).  In short, voters identify more and more with the 
core programs of political parties, and as a result, leaders are given more of a mandate to 
carry out their initiatives. 
This is where Theriault’s notion of procedural change comes into the picture.  As 
a result of the (previously mentioned) first step, party and constituent preferences are 
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aligning quite nicely, strengthening party leadership.  Party leaders feel growing pressure 
to get things done, to please their more homogeneous, core supporters, and to capitalize 
on the extended powers granted by rank and file members aiming to survive in a 
politically volatile climate.  The changing step of party leadership is both the procedural 
change element of Theriault’s summary of polarization in the postmodern House of 
Representatives, and it is the second step that relies on sorting, redistricting, and party 
activism just as these three depend on procedural change in any effort made to give a 
holistic account of polarization. 
A host of observers of congressional leadership step in where Theriault and other 
scholars of political polarization have left off.  “Centralization,” according to Smith and 
Gamm, “occurs when the parties are polarized, electoral conditions are favorable to the 
majority party, and the institutional context permits control of legislative outcomes by a 
centralized majority party” (Smith and Gamm 162).  The question of party leadership in 
the U.S. House of Representatives is directly relevant to the research I will employ on 
special preference given to Blue Dogs within the Democratic Party.  Furthermore, there is 
an implicit significance present in further establishing the context within which the BDC 
operates, and this narrative would be incomplete without addressing the changing role of 
party leadership. 
Party Leadership 
 The creation of the Blue Dog Coalition is largely a reaction to tension between the 
caucus and party policy platform.  Party leadership, and the rewards they allocate to 
members of their party, must be understood if the behavior of Blue Dogs is to be 
understood with any sense of holistic clarity.   Furthermore, the effect that the emergence 
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of the BDC may have on the concentration of power designated to House leaders is 
entirely dependent on theories of party centralization.  Power has been wielded with the 
effectiveness of Newt Gingrich and Nancy Pelosi before, and a look at this history might 
provide a better framework to view the BDC. 
 Speaker Reed (1889) and Speaker Cannon (1903) wielded committee assignments 
and rules to shape laws and policy as they saw fit.  If “the aim of the party leadership is to 
enact as much of the party’s program as possible,” then Speaker Reed and Cannon were 
archetypes for brilliant and powerful leadership that most Speakers have not come close 
to in the last one hundred years (Aldrich and Rohde, 38).  The Blue Dogs emerge from a 
time again charged with boisterous partisan leadership.  Speaker Gingrich, and to a lesser 
extent Speaker Pelosi, have been effective and strong enough to recall the memory of 
Cannon and Reed. 
The 104th Congress, then, witnessed a resurgence of strong party leadership as a 
result of a renewed sense of clarity from polarized ideologies.  The 1990s were the 
culmination of changes that had been taking place since the mid-1970s.  If Smith and 
Gamm are correct, “Party leaders are strong only when their party colleagues allow them 
to be strong” (Smith and Gamm 142).  So where do the Blue Dogs fit in with their 
primary goal of fiscal responsibility, even at the cost of intraparty friction?  Are they the 
victim of party discipline or the subject of Democratic preference?  Can we trace unusual 
punishment or undue rewards being doled out to the caucus for its unique position within 
the House? 
It may be helpful to consider the distribution of political spoils in terms of 
positives only; in other words, one should consider any given leadership style as one of 
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the “carrot,” with punishment not so much the traditional “stick” but more so the absence 
of the “carrot.”  Forgette writes about “coordination rather than enforcement” as the 
“primary role for the congressional party caucus” (Forgette 2004, 411).  Only in the case 
of “a clear breach in ethics, gross party disloyalty (such as supporting another party’s 
presidential candidate), or perhaps defection on an initial organizational vote” would the 
concrete enforcement of party discipline truly be required (Forgette 2004, 412).  This is, 
and has been for quite some time, the dilemma of party leadership.  When is it 
appropriate to discipline members of your own party, and how can you be sure you will 
not collapse your majority if you choose to do so?  The Blue Dogs, while much higher 
than the 20% party unity scores of previous conservative Democrats, are truly the focal 
point of this debate. 
Some argue that, as the majority gains control, leaders will stack key committees 
with party loyalists to enact this agenda.  Others claim that leaders will press factions into 
deeper bonds to the overall party by employing a more inclusive, proportional 
representation of members in the various institutions that form legislation.  This gets to 
the heart of my second research question, which integrates political leadership theory 
with my specific interest in the Blue Dog Coalition.  Ultimately, things like party unity 
scores and fund raising numbers matter a great deal to political leaders, and as usual, the 
Blue Dogs have placed themselves in the center of things. 
 
Conditional Party Government (CPG) Theory 
 The Conditional Party Government (CPG) Theory is an attempt to discover the 
necessary circumstances for the nourishment of increased party leadership.  When a 
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political party is unified in Congress, they will allow the leadership to take a more 
assertive role in determining the direction of the agenda.  When that unified party is 
facing a hostile opposition, the tendency to rely on strong party leadership goes up even 
more.  In the words of Aldrich and Rohde, the Conditional Party Government Theory, 
“contends that members’ decisions on allocating power to the party leadership depend on 
the degree of preference agreement within the party and the amount of preference conflict 
between parties” (Aldrich and Rohde 217).  
 In short, CPG theory claims that centralization of a party, or the amount of power 
allocated to leadership, is dependent on the level of preference unity within a party and 
friction between parties (Aldrich 2008, 217).  The institutional context and electoral 
conditions do not demand that the parties represent one homogeneous ideology in the 
process of centralizing leadership; in fact, the conflict that Blue Dogs bring to the 
congressional context may be a contributing factor to the empowerment of Democratic 
leadership. 
 The volatility of a partisan coalition, whether rooted in voices of regionalism or 
conservatism, creates a need for a strong hand in keeping the party together.  One can go 
so far as claiming, “sharp intraparty factionalism, more than interparty differences, 
stimulated liberals to strengthen their central party leader and weaken the powers of full 
committee chairs, many of whom were conservatives” (Smith and Gamm 157).  Fear of a 
majority crumbling to inefficient bickering and a lack of consensus prompts members to 
cede more authority to the Speaker than situations of greater unity. 
 This analysis can be simplified into three guiding questions.  First, have intraparty 
homogeneity and interparty divergence remained high?  These are the foundation for any 
22 
 
circumstance that could lead to a fortified party leadership.  Second, has the majority 
party delegated strong powers to its leaders?  This is the action that the CPG truly focuses 
on; it is the end to the aforementioned means.  Finally, has the majority leadership 
exercised this power to facilitate legislation and electoral goals?   Analyzing whether or 
not leadership has taken advantage of the new legislative assets is more a confirmation 
that the previous two steps have taken place than an independent factor in itself.  Given 
new powers to legislate with higher efficiency, party leaders will use them to the best of 
their capabilities. 
Parties Matter 
The Blue Dog Coalition provides an opportunity to test theories of party 
significance on a smaller scale.  Theories on the source of preference can be focused into 
one defining set of policies, fiscal conservatism, and tested for external influence exerted 
upon this group of legislators.  In this sense, the rich literature explaining what role 
partisan organizations play in the development of voting behavior within Congress 
benefits from an analysis of Blue Dogs, just as a deeper look into the character of the 
BDC is achieved along the way. 
This general understanding makes up the first camp of congressional scholarship 
on the significance of parties.  Their claim is simple: parties matter.  The aforementioned 
Conditional Party Government (CPG) theory is at the heart of this debate, but there is a 
basic argument being made that encompasses much of what frequently passes as political 
common sense.  Smith and Gamm say it best, “A majority party that votes in a 
disciplined manner and controls policy outcomes does so primarily because of the 
underlying policy agreement of its members” (Smith and Gamm 143).  Parties are based 
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in common ideology, but it is the discipline of its members that leads to a controlled 
policy outcome. 
A large group of congressional scholars maintain that parties matter.  Studies on 
polarization, leadership, and the CPG are all touched by an ongoing debate over the 
significance of the Republican and Democratic institutions.  The argument is relatively 
straightforward and intuitive; parties directly impact preference, as organizations with 
whips and leadership positions wielding both informal and formal mechanisms.  “The 
aim of the party leadership is to enact as much of the party’s program as possible,” and 
implicit in this statement is an understanding that parties, and thus party leadership, have 
the capability to influence members of their organization (Bond and Fleisher 2004, 38).  
Does it make sense that this is now and has been the case throughout the history of the 
modern House of Representatives? 
Parties are political organizations that seek electoral victories as a means of 
participation in government.  Republicans and Democrats wage campaigns nationally just 
for the chance to enact their collectively agreed upon policies.  Adherants of the “party 
matters” argument claim that sometimes members vote contrary to their true preference 
as a result of their party membership.  In fact, the collectively agreed upon policies are 
sometimes the product of rough, conflicting view points being hammered out by whips to 
keep the party running smoothly. 
Convincing others to change their position on a bill is a central part of political 
strategy.  Positions are not locked into their orientation of true preference, and lawmakers 
can and are regularly influenced by forces beyond their own views.  Inconsistencies 
within political parties clearly arise, and arise frequently, but “leaders then induce them – 
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through compromises, side payments, and threats – to pledge their votes should they be 
needed” (King and Zeckhauser 2003, 389).  
 This is even more apparent in the disparities of party unity scores on different 
forms of voting.  “If only preferences matter, then the relationship between ideology and 
voting behavior should be the same for close and lopsided roll calls,” but a pattern of 
party pressure enforced on party votes is “borne out in the data, and it is reflected in both 
the aggregate roll-call voting scores and on specific bills” (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and 
Stewart 2001, 551).  When legislative representatives are in private, closed-door 
conversations among themselves, we see compromises on the order and nature of 
legislative initiatives unrolled to protect members from issues of electoral sensitivity. 
Party structure, as the CPG already suggests, is about more than preference.  If 
parties held no significance beyond the individual preferences of its members, then a 
legislative period in which Democrats and Republicans each won half of the time would 
result in a congressional voting average of the point exactly between Democrats and 
Republicans on an ideological scale.  The real outcome, however, would be a division of 
results between the medians of each party.  Aldrich also argues that there is no automatic 
counterbalance present in minority action.  While the Republicans in the 104th Congress 
dramatically strengthened the control of their leadership, the Democratic minority 
responded with no similar action.   
Finally, the evolution of congressional rules and powers allocated to leadership 
offers definitive support to the argument of party significance.  There is really quite a lot 
that can be done at the top to influence the lower ranks of Congress.  Leaders can frame 
amendments to target political opponents, forcing tough decisions, or similarly maneuver 
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to counter such an effort.  This is the process of conspiracy.  Leaders can induce 
members to support policies that might be unfavorable through the use committee 
chairmanship positions and other positions of prestige.  This use of the “carrot” is 
referred to as inducement.  The Speaker and other powerful members of a party can also 
sweeten policy deals, by packaging tough to swallow positions with wide ranging 
benefits that make opposition difficult.  This form of bulking up controversial initiatives 
is known as contextual self-interest (Aldrich and Rohde 2000, 58-61). 
Leadership in 1970s all but threatened the political lives of southern Democrats, 
threatening to replace them with more loyal members.  As a result, Jamie Whitten (D-
Miss.), as one example, changed voting behavior drastically to fall into party line (Bond 
and Fleisher 2004).  With this ability to alter preference and voting patterns when 
absolutely necessary, the “influence of the majority party was increased asymmetrically, 
without any counterbalancing increase for the minority” (Aldrich and Rohde, Ch. 3).  The 
same was done under Gingrich’s watch in 1998, as he replaced influential committee 
members that posed a threat to very his policy agenda.  This nature of congressional 
pressure is impossible to ignore, and difficult to credit solely to individual legislators’ 
preferences. 
 
Parties Do Not Matter  
The Blue Dog Coalition was created by a group of lawmakers that shared 
common policy preference.  There is no clearer application of Krehbiel’s explanation on 
the exaggeration of political parties’ influence.  The BDC demonstrates the way in which 
a collection of individuals can join without many of the political pressures associated 
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with admission into formal political parties, and the positive or negative change in 
preferences relative to the caucus offer an excellent opportunity to analyze how caucuses 
push their political will upon their members. 
The importance of party organizations has not gone uncontested within the 
American politics literature on congressional theory.  Some, and here Krehbiel is at the 
forefront, simply claim that political parties are the product of preexisting commonalities 
of members.  Parties are images of the bigger picture; the compilation of shared 
preferences among hundreds of lawmakers. 
A rift has emerged among American political scientists; those who find political 
parties unimportant challenge the underlying assumption of partisan influence.  The 
critics, individuals who claim parties’ role in legislative matters has been overstated, 
claim, “party behavior is independent of preferences” (Krehbiel 1993, 255).  Krehbiel 
argues that party effects are either nonexistent or insignificant, that party preference is a 
mere reflection of member preference, and that there is a risk of “misrepresenting, if not 
overstating, the significance of parties as organizations of governing” (Krehbiel 1993, 
262).  The position taken by those who agree with this view create a valuable challenge 
to the primary view of parties as important and significant players that influence 
expressed Congressional preferences. 
Krehbiel’s assumes that political parties are significant influencing organizations 
and seeks to prove or disprove this assumption in his work. In short, phenomena are 
important, and parties are correlated with these phenomena.  Therefore, parties are, by 
causal implication, important (Krehbiel 1993, 237).  The assumption of causation in 
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places where correlation exists is the purpose for Krehbiel’s critique, and the most helpful 
point of his deconstruction of narratives on party significance. 
Krehbiel’s findings are conclusive in that he fails to prove a strong, positive effect 
of parties.  In Krehbiel’s seminal work “Where’s the Party?” five policy domains 
(Defense, Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Education, and Labor) are set up and tested for 
party effects that might have a direct impact on legislators’ final decision. In his words, 
“party fails to establish itself as an independently significant force, consistent with the 
definition” (Krehbiel 1993, 240).   
Krehbiel’s work becomes relevant when testing for the significant of a sub-party 
unit behaving in many of the same ways as parties.  This analysis of significant party 
behavior in committee assignments has led to my own questioning of significant caucus 
behavior in similar assignments.  Krehbiel, however, comes to the conclusion that 
“partisanship does not explain much variation in the observed stages of organizing the 
legislature” (Krehbiel 1993, 237).  This claim can and will be applied to the caucus level 
of analysis. 
This leads to the one question I have unabashedly borrowed in my search to apply 
common questions of partisan significance to the caucus level: “do individual legislators 
vote with fellow party members in spite of their disagreement about the policy in 
question or do they vote with fellow party members because of their agreement about the 
policy in question” (Krehbiel 1993, 238).  The source of decision-making is a question 
that places the significance of the Blue Dog Coalition in a new light.  If Krehbiel is 
correct in his thinking that party unity is a product of commonality, then the BDC should 
be viewed just as most traditional caucuses are – another tool in the belt of legislators.  
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However if Blue Dogs behave as a micro-party organization and Krehbiel is wrong, then 
there should be concrete evidence of exerted influence upon a significant number of 
members. 
The self-critique of “Where’s the Party?” outlines much of what is missing from 
Krehbiel’s primary argument.  The significance of parties is not limited to legislation.  
Data on committee appointments and assignments does not constitute an exhaustive 
search for signs of party significance.  Parties may be so effective that the effects of party 
pressure may have tainted the preferences Krehbiel interprets as truly reflective of an 
individual.  Finally, and I think most importantly, “some party theorists claim that parties 
are creators of, and thus antecedent to, policy cleavages, policy preferences, intensities of 
preference and so on” (Krehbiel 1993, 257).  In the end, I think Krehbiel’s estimation of 
the limits of parties in American politics is extreme; if nothing else, the electoral 
responsibility of reflecting the values embedded within a party label, the requirement of a 
lawmaker to do as a Democrat (or Republican) would do, is more than Krehbiel really 
gives due credit for. 
To reiterate, Krehbiel’s approach is laudable.  His focus on party behavior can be 
applied to caucuses and the Blue Dogs.  For my purpose, I find Krehbiel’s critics and 
their party significance orientation persuasive.  However, I will aim to mimic Krehbiel’s 
test at the caucus level in order to shed light on the Blue Dogs, specifically, and caucuses 
as a force of growing importance, broadly. 
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Caucus History 
The Blue Dog Coalition may demonstrate the next stage in the development of 
caucuses within the House of Representatives.  The group presents a highly selective, 
rigidly organized voluntary institution outside of direct Democratic control, and with the 
extensive system of whips, committee chairs, and compulsory voting rules within the 
BDC, the organization has set itself apart from other caucus organizations. 
The informal nature of caucuses provides a certain flexibility that has, over the 
last few decades, begun to take on a unique position within the political system.  I will 
argue that the Blue Dog Democrats are at the forefront of this change in the role of 
caucuses, reaching levels of such prestige and influence that they represent a new 
division of congressional labor. 
The history of the House of Representatives is on a course of microevolution; in 
the natural democratization and organization of its members, Congress has been divided 
and subdivided into more manageable units of associations throughout its history.  The 
first of these major decisions was the division into the two major political parties of 
American politics.  Next, parties utilized the division of labor in the form of committees, 
which varied in power throughout the 20th century alone.  Finally, caucuses have begun 
to advance this evolution into a sphere of informal influence that cannot be directly 
controlled by the House without an outright ban.  Essentially, each of these stages 
represents a turning point in the level of control each legislator has on his or her own 
career, policy agenda, and ability to improve his or her skill as a lawmaker. 
Dating back half a century, caucus organizations have slowly crept into the status 
quo of lawmaking in the United States.  Singh utilizes Hammond’s definition of the 
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groups as “a voluntary association of members of congress, without recognition in 
chamber rules or line-item appropriations, that seeks a role in the policy process” (Singh 
1998, 57).  Scholars point to the Democratic Study Group, founded in 1959, as a starting 
point for Congressional Membership Organizations.   
For the next ten years, only a handful of similar groups emerged.  By the 1970s, 
however, caucuses began to pick up steam, growing more steadily into the 80s and 90s.  
In 1990, around one hundred caucuses existed.  As of 2008, “over 400 caucuses exist[ed] 
in the contemporary House and almost every Member of Congress belong[ed] to at least 
one caucus” (Miler 2008 2).  As Singh’s definition above explains, caucuses are 
organizations that work under the radar, producing raw political goods – electoral, 
informational, monetary or otherwise – as a reaction to institutional barriers. 
 Since the pivotal 104th Congress, caucuses do not receive the institutional support 
they once claimed, yet CMOs continue not only to sustain their membership but also to 
increase in frequency and popularity despite the loss of a budget, staff, office space, and 
various other assets that congressional committees enjoy.  “As part of broader changes in 
the House rules, the Republican leadership included provisions that eliminated 
institutional funding and support for congressional member organizations,” including the 
restriction of “caucus employees, separate office space, or even separate webpage” (Miler 
2008, 5-6). 
The institutional development and growth of caucuses has allowed these groups to 
provide members with leadership skills, greater representation, policy expertise, and a 
way of proliferating and gathering information (Singh 1998, 22-23).  Caucuses are way 
for leaders to be groomed for the future management of the party.  It is a training grounds 
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of sorts; a microcosm of the larger obligations of Congress that allows newcomers and 
vulnerable members the ability to build up experience, confidence, and clout. 
Hammond outlines six types of caucuses in the House:  Party, Regional, Industry, 
Identity, and Policy (Hammond 1991, 279).  Party caucuses are intraparty groups with 
common ideology and aspirations of improved party position and legislative outcome.  
Boll Weevils (Conservative Democratic Forum) and, of course, the Blue Dogs are 
immediate examples that come to mind, but class clubs also fit neatly into this category.  
This is the focus of my research on caucuses, as it is the category that best explains the 
BDC.  
Miler explained that, “membership in caucuses is strictly voluntary and there are 
no restrictions concerning the maximum (or minimum) number of members in a caucus” 
(Miler 2008, 3).  That is no longer the case, at least not with the Blue Dogs.  Membership 
is capped, and this may demonstrate the next step in the evolution of Congressional 
Member Organizations, or simply the unique status of the BDC.  From any perspective, 
the Coalition is not constrained by this laissez-faire membership approach. 
 
Caucus Purpose, Motives Theory 
Caucuses fill the void of leadership that has failed to include or listen to minority 
voices, train legislators with the expertise and education needed to better craft policy, 
influence the development of legislation, and gain voter recognition.  These are the core 
purposes for the existence of caucuses, and the Blue Dogs are a successful demonstration 
of each.  The Blue Dog Coalition is a response to a perceived absence of Democratic 
action on fiscal issues, and in their struggle to fill that vacuum, they have built up a 
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reputation as proficient in budget, debt and deficit policies.  This skill set, acquired once 
in the ranks of the BDC, translates into a voice on major bills that correspond with their 
interests as well as an electoral label of being frugal and thrifty. 
Representatives join caucuses to promote electoral goals.  These informal 
organizations act as another “venue for constituency representation” (Miler 2), and as 
such immediately demand prioritized attention to lawmakers.  Politicians are rational 
human beings, and as such act in their best self-interest.  Caucuses are an extension of 
this reasoning, and as the history of CMOs suggests, the evolution of the organization is a 
reaction to the larger picture of Congressional context. 
Representatives join caucuses to rival the institutional power of committees, 
which remain firmly under the command of party leadership.  The gravity of committee 
benefits and the inability for minority ideologies and more junior members of political 
parties to receive immediate rewards meant that these individuals would need to respond 
accordingly.  Caucuses are an informal, adaptable response to exclusion from committee 
rewards. 
Representatives are more likely to join caucuses if they are junior members, in the 
minority party, in weaker districts, and generally in greater need of an alternative channel 
of power.  “The data also shows that more liberal Democrats are less likely to belong to 
one (or more) partisan caucuses, which likely reflects the strength of moderate party 
caucuses such as the Blue Dog Coalition” (Miler 2008, 20).  Blue Dogs emerged as a 
group of conservative Democrats fighting for their political careers.  In many ways, then, 
the story of the BDC is the quintessential example of caucuses forming due to their 
circumstances within the balance of political power. 
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As Singh puts it, the function of a caucus is informational, legislative, and 
representational as it behaves both as “interest group” and “labor union” in congressional 
context (1998).   CMOs behave as an interest group in so far as they achieve policy goals, 
while simultaneously improving the position and resources of its members in its labor 
union function.  The dichotomous goals of caucuses fit perfectly with the nature of 
legislators themselves, because caucuses are the pure self-made tools of legislators.  They 
have been shaped by common, run of the mill lawmakers for the purpose, among others, 
of more efficient congressional work. 
Caucuses form as a reaction to a failure in leadership and out of a need to 
enhance electoral goals (Hammond 1991).  Members without direct access to power have 
essentially found an alternative to the party system.  Party leadership, in its inability to 
represent or address the concerns of key groups, has “allowed ad hoc groups to arise and 
fill the vacuum” of partisan guidance (Hammond 1991, 280). 
Caucuses are bound by self-imposed rules, not unlike parties, but the more direct 
role of these informal institutions makes for some interesting variations on the freedom of 
member within these institutions.  In the absence of a clear, engaged party leadership that 
accepts the BDC position of fiscal conservatism, it seems that members have developed 
their own sub-party unit into a more centralized organization with strikingly similar 
features of delegated authority.  All of this seems to be, at least in part, the result of a 
void in their preferred form of party leadership. 
The Blue Dogs’ narrow scope of fiscal conservatism allows for voting freedom in 
virtually all other aspects of legislation, yet even a single-issue caucus such as the BDC 
has begun to expand its influence upon its members.  With organizational success, a 
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growth in influence over its members has occurred; there is a “new internal rule that 
binds all of their members to the group’s position if two-thirds of the members support 
the position,” offering a clear example of the ideological unity desired by the caucus as a 
whole (Pearson and Schickler 2009, 185). 
 Providing “psychological and solidary support” is one aspect of caucuses in 
which the Blue Dogs have found success.  Loomis summarizes the effectiveness of their 
organization cleanly: 
Given a strong sense of internal loyalty and camaraderie, coupled with a 
formal institutional presence as a caucus, the Blue Dogs have taken their 
commitment to fiscal conservatism very seriously, as they have sought to 
remain united as a centrist block in order to affect final votes and 
particular elements of the House Democratic agenda (Loomis 2009, 2).   
 
In this sense, the BDC has taken advantage of the small, more tight knit bonds 
among members (relative to the broader membership of the Democratic Party) to 
further solidify its unity on a personal level outside of institutional mechanisms. 
 
Rules and Voting Strategy 
The Blue Dog Coalition’s role as a labor union, promoting and protecting the 
interests of its members, cannot be discussed without pointing out points of opportunity 
in which the caucus can flex its influence.  The development of rules, the construction of 
voting strategy, and various other subtle maneuvers of party leadership in its enactment 
of policy initiatives can create a buffer for some of the inconsistencies within the 
Democratic coalition of ideologies.  In this sense, a clear understanding of the connection 
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between rule development and leadership consideration of the sometimes electorally 
vulnerable BDC membership is absolutely essential. 
Crafting the procedural guidelines for a legislative session is as important an 
action as the construction of the legislation itself.  The creation of a context that will 
support vulnerable bills is the necessary prerequisite to effective vote gathering.  
Examples of strategic rules are abundant and essential in today’s combative political 
climate:   
For example, what if a southern Democrat in the late 1980s was faced with 
a bill to which the GOP planned to attach an antiabortion amendment? … 
In our theory, however, she would have a third (and preferable) choice: 
vote for a party-sponsored restrictive rule that deprived the Republicans 
from offering such an amendment in the first place. (Aldrich and Rohde, 
58) 
 
This kind of protection often eludes the public discourse, allowing subtle, preventative 
methods to be enacted at little cost to the majority party.   
 In theory, Blue Dogs are ideal targets for rules.  In a Democratic run legislature, it 
is in the best interest of leadership to fortify the position of members who might hold 
positions on unrelated issues of morality that draw Republican fire.  The same might 
apply for a Republican led congress using Blue Dogs to push through a bill.  Just as in the 
example of the southern Democrat above, Blue Dogs might be forced to make a tough 
decision between party unity and saving face at home.  These are the decisions that 
leaders, through effective construction of rules, should limit. 
Vote buying is another tactical niche being carved out by the Blue Dogs.  Leaders, 
being rational actors seeking to maximize benefits for their party, will seek to pass 
legislation at the lowest possible cost.  However due to the heterogeneity of 
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circumstances behind individual legislators’ preferences (ideology, constituency interests, 
etc.), a majority may need to be assembled through either coercion or incentive.  In many 
cases, the cheapest solution is not confined to the borders of a political party. 
King and Zeckhauser describe the “size principle” as a product of the zero-sum 
cooperative game that legislators operate within.  This principle claims that there is one 
finite pie of political goods, and legislative initiatives will either produce Minimum 
Winning Coalitions (MWC) or universalistic coalitions (King and Zeckhauser 2003. 
391).  For the purpose of the Blue Dog Democrats, MWCs frame the way leadership 
interacts with this caucus in an interesting ways.  Have Blue Dogs become the cheap vote 
for Republicans to pick up or the price-raising problem child of the Democratic Party? 
As an example, earning the support of a threatened majority member might cost 
more, while the vote of a safe opposition moderate might be bought much cheaper.  The 
Blue Dogs fit neatly into this category of moderates for sale, or moderates too expensive 
to buy.  Aldrich and Rohde write on “the GOP’s routine whip contacts with the “Blue 
Dog” Democrats in the 104th and 105th Congresses” as a case in support of this vote-
purchasing model (Bond and Fleisher 2004, 39).   
King and Zeckhauser also discuss “hip-pocket” votes and the extraordinary 
benefit available to leaders through the reserve nature of the agreements.  It is useful to 
have the ability to have x amount of votes in the bag, without having to spend them in 
landslide or unreasonably challenging tasks.  Evidence “consistent with models of 
moderate vote-buying is weak, at best,” but the theoretical incentive is there 
(Ansolabehere, Snyder, Stewart 560).  Blue Dogs and other moderate legislators, 
“knowing they will not be subject to the most severe costs, will sell their votes or their 
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vote options cheaper,” which will in turn increase the demand for their support (King and 
Zeckhauser 2003, 398).  Also, legislators will feign hesitancy on measures to which they 
already support, simply to reap the purely political rewards of playing hard to get. 
Concluding rules and strategies of vote inducement, it is safe to say that voters 
anticipate a likely outcome and behave accordingly.  There were more small wins than 
small losses (18.1% vs. 10.1%) in King and Zeckhauser’s findings, and narrow wins are 
more frequent than narrow losses.  “The day-to-day practice of building coalitions works 
more like an options market than a bazaar” (King and Zeckhauser 2003, 405), and the 
calculated workings of Congress draw in members like the BDC with their predictable 
platform of fiscal conservatism and their relatively strong ties to the Democratic Party. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Blue Dog Coalition can be analyzed under the fused perspective of both party 
and caucus literature.  The debate on the significance of party influence on congressional 
voting behavior will be applied to the caucus level.  Results should contribute to both 
caucus and party-level analysis.  The Blue Dog Coalition, acting as a party-within-a-
party, presents an opportunity for a novel application of prominent theorists from each 
literature.  
Polarization provides a context for the origins of the BDC.  Furthermore CPG 
theorists describe polarized climates, such as the environment surrounding the BDC 
inception, as one of many contributing factors in the concentration of power in party 
leadership.  I will explore the extent of leadership-BDC relations through the committee 
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spoils system.   More fundamentally, Krehbiel challenges the significance of parties in 
their ability to affect individual legislator preferences.  In turn, I will test for independent 
influence that caucuses, as a smaller party-like organization, may have on its members’ 
voting behavior.   
Polarization contributes to Conditional Party Government Theory as an 
explanation of concentrated influence in the House of Representatives.  In turn, this sets 
the stage for the great debate on party significance and individual preferences.  From this 
point, it is possible to move the argument forward through the application of these themes 
on a caucus-level of analysis.  By doing this, we can test for caucus organizational 
influence, caucus-leadership relations, and the role of caucus in calculations of strategic 
voting and the construction of legislation. 
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Chapter 3: Findings 
Question #1: The Source of Preference 
The Blue Dog Coalition has sought to declare itself as a semi-sovereign institution 
within Congress by its mere existence as a policy focused caucus outside of the 
mainstream Democratic platform.  The BDC demarcates the boundaries between Blue 
Dogs and non-Blue Dogs very clearly when it comes to issues of fiscal conservatism, and 
whether it is ideological reflection or electoral grand strategy, the purpose of the Blue 
Dog Coalition is clearly to serve the needs of its members.   
In the midst of this, the Krehbiel vs. CPG-theorists argument allows us to frame 
the one question that may matter most for this research project: Do the Blue Dogs, as an 
organization, hold significance beyond the preference of individual members of the 
coalition? 
In an effort to clearly answer this question, I have asked the question that imitates 
the debate on party significance.  Does the Blue Dog Coalition have common legislative 
preference “in spite of disagreement” or “because of their agreement” (Krehbiel 1993, 
238)?  Do Blue Dogs, upon entry into the organization, respond by becoming more 
conservative?   
I have collected and analyzed a variety of variables meant to measure 
conservative tendencies in individual members.  The ratings of the National Taxpayers 
Union and American Conservatives Union, two interest groups, will serve this goal.  
Party unity scores will be employed as yet another measure to take into consideration.  As 
with all aspects of this research, the values for Blue Dogs will be contrasted with all 
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Democrats not in the Blue Dog Coalition2
With the differences laid out over the period ranging from the 104th to the 110th 
Congress, these four variables can be used as a tool to measure the change experienced 
by new members of the Blue Dog Coalition.   
.    Finally, the DW Nominate score produced 
by Poole and Rosenthal will aid my attempt to place the Blue Dogs on the ideological 
spectrum. 
 
Hypothesis #1a: Joining the BDC increases the fiscal conservatism of new 
members 
 
Hypothesis #1b:  Blue Dogs will be more fiscally conservative than non-
Blue Dogs 
 
The goal here is to calculate and analyze the mean change of returning members of the 
House of Representatives, members who have served at least one term as a non-Blue 
Dog, and contrast these numbers with their non-Blue Dog counterparts.  In this way, I 
have provided a glimpse of the immediate effects of admission to the BDC upon 
members who have shown a pre-caucus pattern of voting behavior. 
 
Party Unity 
   As previously explained, party unity scores are a percentage of party-dividing 
votes on which the member of Congress supported his or her party leadership (Meinke, 
Codebook for House and Senate Voting Behavior Data Sets).  This score will be used to 
                                                 
2 Throughout the tables and graphs, these two groups will be described as BDC (given the 
value of 1), or members of the Blue Dog Coalition, and non-BDC (value=0), all other 
Democrats. 
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discover any significant divide between Blue Dogs and non-Blue Dogs.  The party unity 
score is a widely used and widely trusted measurement of internal party cohesion. 
 
Party Unity Means  
 The party unity of Blue Dog Democrats from the 104th to 110th Congress averaged 
around 74.7 over 218 observations.  This is in comparison to the 91.2 mean of the 1244 
non-Blue Dog Democrats observed over the same period of time.  Immediately there is a 
substantial gap according to this variable that sets off Blue Dogs from their non-caucus 
counterparts suggesting that Blue Dogs do vote less along party lines than Democrats 
outside of their organization.  In other words, Blue Dogs, on average, have been 
behaving differently from the rest of the Democratic Party.  Below is the table 
demonstrating the mean party unity of Blue Dogs vs. Non-Blue Dogs during this time 
period: 
 
(Table 1-A) 
 Mean Party Unity T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog 74.66733   
Non-Blue Dog 91.22437   
Total 88.75553 22.5363 <0.001 
 
Party Unity Mean Change 
 From the 104th to the 110th, many things changed in the American political 
landscape.  Most importantly, perhaps, was a swing from Republican leadership back to 
Democratic control in the House of Representatives.  I have compared Blue Dogs to Non-
Blue Dog Democrats to acknowledge the change in party unity that might occur as a 
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result of this swing and to differentiate, if indeed there is such a gap in score, the two 
groups.  During this time, the Blue Dogs began to close the gap on party unity as they 
increased at a much higher rate than their counterparts. 
 My prediction was a greater difference in party unity change among Blue Dogs 
than among non-BDC Democrats, and this is supported by my data.  There is significant 
data to support the idea that Blue Dogs increased in party unity more than their 
Democratic peers over the 104th-110th spectrum.  This may be a result of shifting party 
leadership, as Democratic leaders apply more pressure to push through their proposals, as 
well as a gradual change in electoral support for voting behavior.  The Blue Dogs seem to 
respond to this notion, changing more rapidly than other Democrats, despite having come 
from a lower starting position of party unity.  Blue Dogs increased their party unity, from 
congress to congress, by 2.38 more than legislators outside the Blue Dog Coalition.  The 
data supporting this significant effect of Blue Dogs and average party unity change is 
shown below: 
 
(Table 1-B) 
  
Mean Party Unity 
Change T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog 2.773387     
Non-Blue Dog 0.3913645     
Total 0.725033 -5.0224 <0.001 
 
Party Unity Mean Change of Returning Member 
Taking this pair of variables, I have calculated the mean change in party unity 
from the previous year, the year prior to admission into the BDC, to the first year of Blue 
Dog membership.  The results are predictable.  The Blue Dogs, with their scores lower 
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than the rest of the Democratic Party to begin with, have increased their mean party unity 
score by .79; the rest of the Democrats increased in party unity, on average, by 1.33. 
Interestingly, upon joining the Blue Dog Coalition, legislators have increased in 
party unity, but by .54 less than the rest of their peers in the Democratic Party.  In other 
words, these self-acclaimed conservatives have seen growth in party unity, but only at 
around 68.3% of the rate that the rest of their party has experienced this same 
synchronizing of voting behavior. 
The level of significance fails to meet the standard necessary to reject our null 
hypothesis, however, and this is probably in no small part due to the low number of 
observations for Blue Dogs who have served as non-Blue Dogs in Congress before 
(n=17).  This does not necessarily mean that the findings are erroneous or mere chance, 
but it does mean that we cannot come to a concrete conclusion with the current results.  
The results below reflect this conclusion: 
 
(Table 1-C) 
 
Mean Party Unity 
Change T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog 0.7906568     
Non-Blue Dog 1.333562     
Total 1.323847 0.5599 0.2878 
*All Democrats have served the previous term as non-Blue Dog Democrats. 
 
NTU  
Interest group scores are valuable in that they offer a score to judge political 
representatives, but from a very specific, often issue-oriented perspective.  The mission 
of this group describes its issue emphasis: 
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National Taxpayers Union (NTU) is America's independent, non-partisan 
advocate for overburdened taxpayers. NTU mobilizes elected officials and 
the general public on behalf of tax relief and reform, lower and less 
wasteful spending, individual liberty, and free enterprise. Founded in 
1969, we work at all levels for the day when every taxpaying citizen's 
right to a limited government is among our nation's highest democratic 
principles. (“About NTU” 2009) 
 
While by no means a perfect fit with the ambiguous goal of fiscal responsibility that Blue 
Dogs champion, the organization will provide us with our second variable in the analysis 
of BDC-exerted influence on members.  Any significant shift in NTU scores for newly 
inducted members will offer more support for the hypothesis that the Blue Dog Coalition 
does indeed apply effective pressure upon its members, altering voting behavior. 
 It should be noted that, unlike the ACU, the NTU does not take a small sample of 
significant policies and rate members according to these results.  The NTU website 
describes its effort to establish a large sample to develop the most extensive exploration 
of voting tendencies on issues that directly relate to the Blue Dog creed of fiscal 
conservatism.   
Every year National Taxpayers Union (NTU) rates U.S. Representatives 
and Senators on their actual votes--every vote that affects taxes, spending, 
and debt. Unlike most organizations that publish ratings, we refuse to play 
the "rating game" of focusing on only a handful of congressional votes on 
selected issues. The NTU voting study is the fairest and most accurate 
guide available on congressional spending. It is a completely unbiased 
accounting of votes (“NTU Rates Congress” 2009) 
 
While the Blue Dogs never mention reduction of taxes as a primary goal, the common 
thread of debt reduction should make the caucus a friend of the NTU. 
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NTU Means 
 Blue Dog Democrats scored significantly higher than Non-Blue Dog Democrats 
on the NTU interest group score from the 104th to the 110th Congress.   This result is 
predictable and neatly in line with the basic foundation of Blue Dog claims to fiscal 
conservatism.  By testing this, I aimed to establish a basis for testing preference exerted 
upon and preexisting caucus membership in the Blue Dog Coalition. 
By running a t-test to test the significance of the difference in mean NTU by BDC 
status, I have discovered that the BDC, according to this measurement, are indeed more 
conservative on fiscal issues than other members of their party.  In this sense, the NTU 
score suggests that Blue Dog preference for fiscal conservative behavior (relative to the 
rest of the Democratic Party), does in fact exist. Blue Dogs scored, on average, 
approximately 4.88 points higher according to this variable than their counterparts, as 
shown in the table below.  What is left is a discovery of the source of this preference; 
does it stem from caucus-guided policy or its members’ convictions?  
  
(Table 1-D) 
 
NTU Mean Change 
 Members of the Coalition experienced a greater level of negative mean change in 
NTU scores during the spectrum offered between the Gingrich- and Pelosi-run Houses. 
The average change of the rest of the Democratic Party was roughly a 1.5 point decrease, 
 Mean NTU T-value 
Significance Level  
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog 24.54147   
Non-Blue Dog 19.66158   
Total 20.38638 -7.0558 <0.001 
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signifying a move towards voting behavior not conducive to fiscally conservative tax 
policy.  The Blue Dogs, however, more than doubled the decrease in NTU score, 
reaching an approximate 3.3-point average drop per congress. 
Over time, the Blue Dogs are moving away from the National Taxpayer’s Union 
ideal voting pattern, suggesting a shift away from fiscal conservatism over the six 
Congresses under analysis.  This is an important next step in observing whether Blue 
Dogs change their voting behavior upon joining the BDC.  By first noticing the average 
change in score for all members of Blue Dogs, we can better distinguish important jumps 
in NTU scores at the point of admission into the caucus from normal trends in changing 
behavior.  These results are highly significant, suggesting that the pattern witnessed 
below is probably not due to chance: 
 
(Table 1-E) 
  Mean NTU Change T-value 
Significance Level  
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog -3.307263     
Non-Blue Dog -1.559383     
Total -1.803432 2.3416 0.0097 
 
NTU Mean Change of Returning Member 
 The buildup of NTU mean scores, mean change in score, and mean score for new 
Blue Dogs who are returning members of Congress has led to the analysis of 
Hypothesis1a.  Do members of the Blue Dog Coalition experience external pressure that 
influences behavior with regard to fiscal conservatism or do their expressed preferences 
remain unaffected, as Krehbiel argues with parties, upon admission to the BDC?  My 
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hypothesis was that a bump in NTU score, signaling an increased fiscal conservatism, 
would take place upon entry into the Coalition.  
All Democrats are declining, but the Blue Dogs are declining in NTU score less 
so than their partisan peers.  The evidence I found, therefore, does not support my 
hypothesis.  The results are not significant, and therefore the potential remains that these 
results are the product of chance.  The numbers present, significance aside, do suggest 
that Blue Dogs have experienced a change in NTU score upon admission, but to a lesser 
degree than their Democratic peers who undergo no similar theoretical caucus pressure.  
The numbers below are the basis for this conclusion: 
 
(Table 1-F) 
 Mean NTU Change T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog -2.970588     
Non-Blue Dog -3.893319     
Total -3.87672 -0.5244 0.3001 
*All Democrats have served the previous term as non-Blue Dog Democrats. 
 
ACU 
The American Conservative Union (ACU) was founded just 5 years prior to the 
NTU, and both for my own research and public consumption, the two perform similar 
functions.  The description on the organization’s website describes the utility that the 
score provides for my effort to establish a true understanding of the Blue Dogs below the 
surface level of rhetoric: 
These ratings have throughout the years become a go-to guide to 
determine whether an elected official’s philosophical rhetoric matches his 
or her record. ACU’s purpose in this guide is to inform the public, in an 
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unbiased way, on where individual members of Congress fall on the 
ideological spectrum. (“How We Pick” 2010) 
 
By evaluating the Blue Dogs change in ACU scores before and after joining the caucus, 
and then lining up these numbers with non-BDC, non-freshman Democratic counterparts, 
we begin to notice a clear pattern of separation.3
ACU Means 
 
 In line with my broad hypothesis that Blue Dogs will vote with greater fiscal 
conservatism, the ACU score should reflect a large gap between Blue Dogs and non-Blue 
Dogs with a substantive value for BDC members.  In addition, I expect to see increased 
ACU values upon entry to the BDC. This is meant to demonstrate the presence of caucus 
influence dictating, to at least a small degree, a change in voting behavior that will, as a 
byproduct, result in greater overall conservatism relative to other Democrats. 
The average ACU score of Blue Dogs is significantly higher than Non-Blue Dog 
Democrats.  In fact, the average rating given by the American Conservative Union is 
nearly triple that of the rest of the Democratic Party, suggesting a clear division between 
the voting behavior between the two groups on the most important matters (to the BDC).    
The significance of the relationship of higher ACU scores for Blue Dogs is present 
below: 
 
 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that the ACU does not count missed votes, thus weighting each 
remaining vote more heavily.  If a member of Congress were to only take one of the 
roughly twenty-five votes that are considered in the creation of the ACU score each year, 
his score will be 100.  That being said, the score is a unique opportunity to gauge how an 
organization overtly opposed to liberalism (in the context of American politics) ranks 
individual members of this organization. 
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(Table 1-G) 
  Mean ACU T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog 32.45392     
Non-Blue Dog 11.72227     
Total 14.80151 -19.697 <0.001 
 
ACU Mean Change 
 By examining the drop in ACU scores during the years of the 104th to the time of 
the 110th Congress, I am taking an important first step in providing context for the 
changing voting behavior of each group.  What I expect to discover, again, is a greater 
change in ACU for Blue Dogs than in other Democrats. 
 The results are significant and in accordance with my hypothesis.  Blue Dogs 
experience similar changes in interest scores from the American Conservatives Union as 
they did with the National Taxpayer’s Union.  Members of the Coalition dropped 
approximately 3.01 points in favor with the ACU while the rest of Democrats only fell 
1.05 points.  Again, this is in the context of a large gap in raw mean for ACU scores, but 
we experience the same closing of the gap as we did with party unity and NTU scores.  
On average, the average movement towards liberalism is greater for Blue Dogs than non-
Blue Dogs.  This data can be seen in the Table 1-H: 
 
(Table 1-H) 
  Mean ACU Change T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog -3.019663     
Non-Blue Dog -1.054397     
Total -1.327479 1.6475 0.0498 
 
50 
 
 
ACU Mean Change of Returning Member 
 Upon entry into the Blue Dog Coalition, members of the caucus experience a 3.75 
point decrease in American Conservative Union scores.  This data runs contrary to my 
hypothesis of increased fiscal conservatism upon entry into the caucus.  In addition, the 
rate of change in which Blue Dogs become less conservative is much higher for new Blue 
Dogs than for non-Blue Dogs.  Not only do newly inducted Blue Dog Democrats become 
less conservative, they decrease their conservatism by a larger amount, on average, than 
their Democratic peers.  Table 1-I shows that the difference between means is not 
significant with a .2291 p-value: 
 
(Table 1-I) 
  Mean ACU Change T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog -3.75     
Non-Blue Dog -1.246774     
Total -1.289112 0.7421 0.2291 
*All Democrats have served the previous term as non-Blue Dog Democrats. 
 
Summary of ACU, NTU, and Party Unity 
The graph below lays out the means of both the Non-Blue Dogs and Blue Dogs as 
summarized above, with the “value 1” graphs representing members of the BDC and the 
“value 0” data representing the rest of the Democratic Party.  It shows that Blue Dogs 
hold a lower level of party unity, a slightly higher score according to the National 
Taxpayers Union, and a much higher American Conservatives Union score.  In 
conclusion, the means of three indicators on conservative legislation within Congress 
51 
 
have all been in line with the thesis of Blue Dogs holding a slightly more conservative 
record than their non-BDC counterparts.  The bar graph below (Figure A) offers a simple 
comparison of the two groups (Blue Dogs=1, Non-BDC=0): 
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 Figure B sorts the same variables by congress, in an attempt to show the changing 
patterns of voting behavior for both Blue Dogs; Figure C does the same for non-Blue 
Dogs.  Note the direction in which Blue Dog scores area headed: 
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(Figure B) 
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As the Blue Dog Coalition developed through the next six Congressional sessions 
and electoral changes took place, the mean change of the same variables allowed 
observers to make claims about the nature of the BDC within the party as we judge its 
relative gains or losses in each category.  Both groups increased in party unity, but Blue 
Dogs clearly increased by a higher percentage.  Both groups lost points according to 
NTU and ACU interest group scores, indicating a liberal shift, but Blue Dogs decreased 
by a greater degree according to both variables.  The mean change of party unity, ACU 
scores, and NTU scores for the 104th to 110th Congress is demonstrated below: 
 
(Figure D) 
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The measure of scores based on at least one previous term in Congress as a non-
Blue Dog allows us to view the influence exerted upon members by the BDC as a 
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Congressional Member Organization.  This effort to gauge the significance of the 
institution on voter preferences has provided us with some interesting conclusions.  Upon 
joining the BDC, members of Congress still increased in party unity scores, but at a rate 
less steep than their non-Blue Dog counterparts.  New members of the caucus also lost 
points in both conservative interest group scores, effectively showing that, like regular 
Democrats, they had become more liberal with time.  It should be noted that while the 
change in NTU scores was less dramatic in its swing to the left for the Blue Dogs, ACU 
scores decreased much more for Blue Dogs than regular Democrats in a similar position.  
The results of change in NTU, ACU, and party unity for members of Congress who have 
served at least one previous term as a non-Blue Dog are expressed in the graph below:  
 
(Figure E) 
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NOMINATE 
The split nature of roll calls allows political scientists to map voting patterns, by 
issue, across a continuum.  The process of plotting these points of behavior to 
“conceptualize the legislative process” can be broadly referred to as spatial theory.  The 
NOMINAl Three-step Estimation (NOMINATE) process is a specific probabilistic model 
that can be applied to multidimensional settings.  This method, developed by Poole and 
Rosenthal in Ideology and Congress, aids the process of better identifying legislators and 
the preferences they represent.  The data is compiled through “positions of legislator and 
roll call outcomes solely from observed individual roll call decisions” (Poole and 
Rosenthal 2007, 30).  In this sense, it is blind to external factors of influence, such as 
parties, making it an ideal variable for my research. 
The score composed by Poole and Rosenthal provides a comprehensive 
measurement of members’ ideology, because the use of nearly all voting information, 
especially non-unanimous votes.  The NOMINATE score places members of Congress 
on a -1 to 1 spectrum (with negative numbers being more liberal and positive numbers 
being more conservative), evaluating members’ voting records in their entirety, 
encompassing both social and economic issues.  In this sense, the NOMINATE variable 
offers a broader lens with which we can view the BDC as an ideological unit. 
With roll call voting as the bedrock for this model, it is important we take note of 
the trends present in modern roll calls.  The continuum of ideology presented by Poole 
and Rosenthal is remarkably stable since 1940, with the only major spikes in ideological 
preference change due to key points in American history.  Furthermore, the continuums 
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are increasing in stability, and it is rare that members of Congress change ideology once 
in office.   
Finally, the length of the continuum has changed.  The first 70 years of the 20th 
century experienced gradual shrinkage, while intraparty diversity was stable.  This was 
due to the reduction of the ideological gap between the two parties.  In the last 30 years, 
however, parties have polarized and returned to the highs of 1900, allowing an expansion 
of the continuum once more. 
Unless members change parties, ideology remains relatively constant over a 
career, and “unless the legislator’s voting pattern is extremely noisy, his position will be 
pinned down by his overall pattern of voting, even when there is little or no error” (Poole 
and Rosenthal 2007, 27).  This makes the NOMINATE score an excellent tool for 
measuring the change in ideology that may or may not occur upon entry into the Blue 
Dog Coalition; parties are a restraining variable that alter members voting behavior, but 
what about caucuses?  Will the Blue Dog Coalition influence members so much that their 
NOMINATE score jumps? 
We will be dealing with only one part of the multidimensional score, the first 
dimension, which represents the traditional left-right spectrum of liberalism to 
conservatism as it is interpreted in the United States.  This emphasis on economic and 
government intervention should allow an even more precise way of gauging the Blue 
Dogs changing conservatism over time and upon entry.  The figures below demonstrate 
this change. 
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DW NOMINATE Means 
 The ideological mean of Blue Dog Democrats is much closer to the center than 
that of Non-Blue Dogs within the Democratic Party.  In this sense, claims of unique 
conservatism within a largely liberal party appear to be well founded.  The BDC, on 
average, scored just about .18 points to the left of true center, which is significantly closer 
to the center than the party average.  Non-Blue Dog members of the Democratic Party 
scored approximately .43 points left of center, creating a gap of about .25 of a point 
between the two groups. 
 This stage of analysis importantly builds up our narrative to better view the 
effects of preference in accordance with or in defiance of preexisting positions.  The 
significance level, again, is enough to ensure that the correlation between ideological 
positioning on the DW NOMINATE score is probably not due to chance.  As a result, we 
can claim with 95% confidence the relationship between NOMINATE scores closer to 0 
and membership in the Blue Dog Coalition, as seen in below: 
 
(Table 1-J) 
  Mean DW NOMINATE Score T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog -0.1798914     
Non-Blue Dog -0.4286695     
Total -0.3937287 -21.7016 <0.001 
  
DW NOMINATE Mean Change 
 The average change in DW NOMINATE scores on the first spectrum (economic, 
rather than civil rights ideology) is -.0012207 for Blue Dogs.  Contrasted with the -
.001499 change, we witness a lesser degree of ideological shift, for the first time, among 
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Blue Dog than the rest of the Democratic Party.  Predictably, the shift in ideology is 
extremely slight, with legislators barely adjusting their legislative positions over an entire 
career, but so far as there is movement, the Blue Dogs seem to be moving less so than 
their counterparts outside of the caucus. 
 The two-sample t-test below shows the relationship between the slight liberal shift 
and membership in the Blue Dog Coalition.  Both groups, over the 104th-110th Congress 
period do move left on average, but Blue Dogs move less to the left than the rest of their 
party.  Again, our significance level fails to meet the threshold required to rule out chance 
results.  The results can be seen below: 
 
(Table 1-K) 
  
Mean DW NOMINATE 
Change T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog -0.0012207     
Non-Blue Dog -0.001499     
Total -0.0014625 -0.1285 0.4489 
 
DW NOMINATE Means of Returning Members 
Members of Congress who have served as Non-Blue Dogs in the previous term 
average similar to the broad average of all Democrats’ DW NOMINATE score.  Blue 
Dogs scored just .2374 points to the left of the complete ideological center, with the rest 
of the Democratic Party .4382074 towards the liberal end of the spectrum.  This gap of 
roughly .2 NOMINATE points further liberal than the Blue Dog Coalition, demonstrates 
the unique position of the BDC within the greater umbrella of the Democratic Party. 
The t-test shows the significance level meeting the standards necessary, allowing 
us to make conclusions based on the data that Blue Dogs, returning to Congress and 
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entering the Coalition, hold a mean ideological score more conservative than the majority 
of the Democratic Party.  Whether this reflects preference due to agreement or in the face 
of disagreement remains to be seen, but the basic nature of the caucus seems to be more 
conservative than its home party, as seen in the following table (Table 1-L): 
 
(Table 1-L) 
  Mean DW NOMINATE Score T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog -0.2374     
Non-Blue Dog -0.4382074     
Total -0.4344469 -5.3842 <0.001 
*All Democrats have served the previous term as non-Blue Dog Democrats. 
 
DW NOMINATE Mean Change of Returning Members 
 Finally, the test of changing ideology upon entrance to the Blue Dog Coalition 
allows us to conclude our measurement of caucus influence upon voter behavior.  Blue 
Dogs experience a +.0146, signaling a jump in ideological score towards the 
conservative end of the spectrum. This is the exact type of reaction one would predict if 
there is indeed an independent caucus effect present.  Non-Blue Dogs, in as similar a 
situation as possible, undergo a less radical shift of -.000584 points.  This shows that 
Democrats outside of the Coalition move slightly towards the liberal end of the spectrum.  
Essentially, Blue Dogs join the caucus and experience an immediate right-oriented 
change in voting behavior, while their peers continue the trend of liberal, incremental 
change. 
 For the 17 returning Democrats who joined the ranks of the Blue Dog Coalition, 
the Blue Dogs shifted by .015184 NOMINATE points to become more conservative than 
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the non-Blue Dogs in the Democratic Party.  This spike in fiscal conservatism associated 
with entrance into the Coalition is supported by the test of significance listed below: 
 
(Table 1-M) 
  
Mean DW NOMINATE 
Change T-value 
Significance Level 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Blue Dog 0.0146     
Non-Blue Dog -0.000584     
Total -0.0002996 -2.3571 0.0093 
*All Democrats have served the previous term as non-Blue Dog Democrats. 
  
Using the -1 to 1 spectrum of ideology can sometimes have the unintended 
consequence of dwarfing disparities between groups due to the small scale of units in the 
score, but in this case, the conservative swing of newly elected Blue Dogs and liberal 
continuation of returning members of the Democratic Party shows clearly the difference 
in NOMINATE scores between members of the BDC and regular Democrats.  The mean 
change of DW NOMINATE scores, for Blue Dogs and non-Blue Dogs, are clearly 
demonstrated by these findings. 
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Question #2: Representation on Prestigious Committees 
Committee assignments are one of the primary sources of influence that leaders 
wield over their members; prestigious positions are doled out to the loyal, the vulnerable, 
and the senior members of a party as a way of maintaining cohesion and order in the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  Blue Dogs are not exempt from this system of reward and 
punishment by committee assignments, and as a way of finding patterns that may reflect 
the existence of abnormal preference given to this caucus, I have performed chi square 
tests using cross tabs to contrast BDC and non-BDC Democrats and their assignments 
relative to their numbers. 
 If Blue Dogs receive an undue amount of preference in the selection of the power 
committees, then the null hypothesis of Blue Dogs receiving a normal amount of political 
benefits through this medium can be rejected, suggesting a dynamic relationship with the 
Democratic leadership that could signal either significance or vulnerability of the BDC.  
The selected power committees are as follows: Appropriations, Ways and Means, Rules, 
and Budget.   
 
Hypothesis #2: The Blue Dogs Receive Extra Preference in the Form of 
Prestige Committee Assignments from Party Leadership 
 
By bringing Blue Dogs into the ranks of these committees, leaders keep them 
involved in order to know where they stand.  Membership here translates into 
influence in policy making at the highest level.  So, by hypothesizing that they 
will be overrepresented, I am suggesting that Democratic leadership is looking to 
co-opt the BDC in the committee process. 
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 Democratic leadership has an incentive to reward Blue Dogs for a number 
of reasons.  First, the Blue Dogs behave as majority makers, bulking up the 
legislative power of the party with their mere presence.  Second, in the early days 
of the BDC (104th to 106th) there were a number of Blue Dogs that defected to the 
Republican Party.  Even founding members of the BDC, such as Louisianan Billy 
Tauzin, found that the caucus experiment was not enough to maintain their 
position as Democrat. 
 By creating the Blue Dog Coalition, members of this caucus were 
signaling loudly to their leadership that they were not in line with everything on 
the party platform.  Furthermore, they showed that they were in need of special 
electoral recognition, and most importantly, they needed the ability to influence 
policy through very specific channels.  The unique position of Blue Dogs, as 
majority makers that could potentially be flipped to the opposition camp, created 
an incentive for party leadership to appease Blue Dog Democrats through the 
traditional means of partisan spoils: prestigious committee assignments. 
 Each of these committees represents a tool to carve out the policy agenda of the 
majority party.  The Appropriations Committee sets the target for where funds are to be 
spent.  Ways and Means controls how the American government raises funds.  The 
Committee on Rules sets the pace, order, and structure of policy proposals, while the 
Committee on the Budget reconciles competing budget proposals. 
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The Appropriations Committee 
The Appropriations Committee in the House is powerful because it allocates 
money for general government operations.  Issues ranging from agriculture to national 
security are connected to the decisions made in this prestigious committee.  In many 
ways, Appropriations symbolizes the central purpose of the legislator.  The allocation of 
resources through the legislator is outlined in our most fundamental governing document 
as it claims, “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law” (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9).  Public funds, by 
law, cannot be used for anything other than the appropriated purpose set out by the 
legislature.  Disproportionate representation of Blue Dogs on this committee would signal 
a disproportionate amount of power in the hands of the BDC. 
Table 2-A shows that Blue Dogs are completely unrepresented in the 104th 
Congress’ Appropriations committee.  While 13.51% of non-Blue Dogs hold seats on the 
Appropriations Committee, making decisions on fund allocation daily, not a single Blue 
Dog joined the prestigious committee during the inaugural year of the caucus.  
Importantly, I have noted that the results are not significant, allowing no concrete 
conclusions to be made solely on the data below. 
 
 (Table 2-A) 
104th Congress-Approp Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 160/86.49 18/100.00 178/87.68 
Member 25/13.51 0/0.00 25/12.32 
Total 185/100.00 18/100.00 203/100.00 
*P-value=0.096 
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By the 110th, 7 of the 37 seats on Appropriations were designated to the Blue 
Dogs.  This amounts to a 16.28% (of Blue Dog membership) rise in Appropriation 
Committee participation.  By the 110th, the percentage of Blue Dogs holding positions in 
this committee was greater than the percentage of non-Blue Dogs.  By the 110th 
Congress, the Blue Dogs were very slightly overrepresented in the Appropriations 
Committee, but the data in Table 2-B is not statistically significant. 
 
(Table 2-B) 
110th Congress-Approp Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 160/84.21 36/83.72 196/84.12 
Member 30/15.79 7/16.28 37/15.88 
Total 190/100.00 43/100.00 233/100.00 
*P-value=0.937 
 
The Ways and Means Committee 
 The House Ways and Means Committee is the oldest committee in the U.S. 
Congress.  It embodies the power of the purse in the legislature; it maintains control over 
taxation and revenue-raising policies as well as some of the most expensive government 
projects (i.e. Social Security, Medicare, and other welfare programs). This power 
“derives a large share of its jurisdiction from Article I, Section VII of the U.S. 
Constitution which declares, ‘All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of 
Representatives’” (“Committee History” 2010).  Ways and Means is in many ways the 
premier money committee.  Naturally, legislators will be drawn to this concentration of 
legislative power as a mark of control over the most contentious and important issues to 
the electorate they represent.   
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 Figure 2-C shows that Blue Dogs were, similar to the observations in 
Appropriations, absent from participation in the Ways and Means Committee.  While 
only 8.11% of Democrats outside of the caucus held seats on this elite committee at the 
time, members of the BDC were clearly under represented at the time of their foundation.  
The following results are not significant. 
 
(Table 2-C) 
104th Congress-Ways Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 170/91.89 18/100.00 188/92.61 
Member 15/8.11 0/0.00 15/7.39 
Total 185/100.00 18/100.00 203/100.00 
*P-value=0.209 
 
 By the 110th Congress, 3 of the 43 members (6.98%) of the Blue Dog Coalition 
had entered into the decision making process that controlled the methods of raising 
revenue as well as big budget issues.  Non-Blue Dogs had increased their membership by 
2.94%, and this coincides with a rise in total available seats from 15 to 24.  The raise in 
representation, however, was clearly greater for Blue Dogs; despite this, under 
representation remained the reality of BDC members when contrasted with their 
counterparts in the Democratic Party.   
 
(Table 2-D) 
110th Congress-Ways Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 169/88.95 40/93.20 209/89.70 
Member 21/11.05 3/6.98 24/10.30 
Total 190/100.00 43/100.00 233/100.00 
*P-value=0.427 
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The Committee on Rules 
 The Committee on Rules holds influence based on its tactical importance to 
legislating.  Former House GOP Leader Bob Michel, Ill. best explains the functions of 
this standing committee (1981-1995): 
The Rules Committee [dictates] how a piece of legislation gets to the 
floor, how many amendments will be considered, and how much time will 
be allowed for debate. The Committee usually sets the conditions for 
debate and may also waive various points of order against a bill or an 
amendment which would otherwise prevent House action. Because [of] 
the Rules Committee's critical role in controlling the legislative process, 
the Committee has traditionally been held under the tight control of the 
Speaker, and that is as it should be (Oleszek 1998) 
 
The inextricable links between this committee and party leadership serve as a useful 
method in measuring the relationship between party leadership and Blue Dogs.  ‘Rules’ 
are "privileged simple resolutions that establish the procedural conditions for considering 
legislation on the floor,” and control over these procedures can significantly help or 
hinder the chances of passage through the House (Oleszek 1998) 
 In the 104th Congress, Blue Dogs were not present in the Committee on Rules.  
The 18 self-proclaimed fiscal conservatives were not allocated a seat, but it is important 
to keep in mind that they are in the company of 97.84% of non-BD Democrats.  With 
only 4 positions available on Rules, it is unsurprising that Blue Dogs would receive no 
representation; only 4 members of the entire party enjoyed this status.  The results can be 
found in Table 2-E: 
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(Table 2-E) 
104th Congress-Rules Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 181/97.84 18/100.00 199/98.03 
Member 4/2.16 0/0.00 4/1.97 
Total 185/100.00 18/100.00 203/100.00 
*P-value=0.529 
 
 By the time Democrats had gained power in Congress, 9 available seats were 
allocated amongst the various groups within the Democratic Party; of these seats, 2 were 
given to the BDC.  This demonstrates a very slight overrepresentation of Blue Dogs in 
the Committee that, more so than any other, guides the general direction of a legislative 
era.  While only 3.68% of non-BDC Democrats took part in this activity, 4.65% of the 
Coalition participated in the committee.  This relationship is not significant, however. 
 
 (Table 2-F) 
110th Congress-Rules Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 183/96.32 41/95.35 224/96.14 
Member 7/3.68 2/4.65 9/3.86 
Total 190/100.00 43/100.00 233/100.00 
*P-value=0.766 
 
The Committee on the Budget 
Public Law 93-344 founded the Committee on the Budget in 1974, in the second 
session of the 93rd Congress.  Both the complex development of managing large 
government programs, such as Social Security, and the growing number of conflicts 
between the executive and legislative branch budget goals created a need for the formal 
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institution of the Budget Committee.  In reality, the existence of this committee is a 
reassertion of congressional power over the purse; the timing of its foundation coincides 
with a larger movement of House reforms that allowed for the mechanism to actually deal 
with the many tax and spending issues of the 20th century. 
One of its self-proclaimed purposes is to actually check federal spending, giving 
the Blue Dogs a great incentive to find ways to influence the committee.  The Office of 
History and Preservation, referenced on the Budget website about section, both 
emphasizes the importance of fiscal responsibility, the avowed hallmark of Blue Dog 
Democrats, and ties in the importance of chairmen in the committee: 
 
For much of its history, the Budget Committee’s agenda has been directed 
by centrist House Members who advocated fiscal responsibility while 
crafting compromises between the President’s budget and Congress’s 
appropriations interests.  Although much of the committee’s activity was 
directed toward reconciling executive and congressional budget goals, the 
legislative interests of individual committee chairmen also has played a 
role in steering the committee focus (“A Brief History” 2008)  
 
This relationship between leaders in the Democratic party and budget proposals makes 
the Budget Committee an ideal candidate to test the manner in which BDC members are 
received within the Democratic Party. 
 During their first year in Congress as a CMO, Blue Dogs were overrepresented on 
the Budget Committee.  Exactly 16.67% of the Blue Dog Coalition was present in the 
committee that has the most control over deficit reduction.  Compare this proportion to 
the 8.65% of non-BD Democrats that made up the remaining 16 seats.  Blue Dogs were 
more influential, in terms of committee membership, on matters of Budget than Non-Blue 
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Dogs were, when speaking in percentages of each respective group, but it should be 
stressed, again, that these results were statistically insignificant. 
(Table 2-G) 
104th Congress-Budget Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 169/91.35 15/83.33 184/90.64 
Member 16/8.65 3/16.67 19/9.36 
Total 185/100.00 18/100.00 203/100.00 
*P-value =0.265 
  
 By the time the 110th Congress and Pelosi leadership has come to be a reality, 
Blue Dogs have come closer to proportional parity with their non-BDC counterparts.  The 
BDC picked up one seat in the committee, but dropped to 9.30% of the Coalition taking 
part in the process.  Relative power to influence budget issues, according to committee 
membership alone, decreased between the 104th and 110th Congresses.  Roughly 1 in 
every 10 non-Blue Dog was a member of the Budget Committee during this time, and 
that proportion nearly holds true for Blue Dogs as well.  The very slight under-
representation shown in Figure 3.6h is not supported by significance in its results.  Table 
2-H demonstrates this change, below. 
(Table 2-H) 
110th Congress-Budget Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 171/90.00 39/90.70 210/90.13 
Member 19/10.00 4/9.30 23/9.87 
Total 190/100.00 43/100.00 233/100.00 
*P-value =0.890 
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Prestige Committees 
The total, pooled data for all of the above-described prestige committees is broken 
down in the following congress-by-congress analysis of proportional representation in the 
Democratic Party.  None of the following tables showed significant results from their 
respective chi-square analysis tests.  Nevertheless, some interesting tendencies emerge as 
we follow the linear change in percentage of Blue Dogs represented on these four 
committees. 
During the 104th Congress, Blue Dogs received 3 of the 59 seats, amounting to 
16.67% of the Blue Dog receiving prestige committee inclusion.  Meanwhile, 30.27% of 
Non-Blue Dogs took part in the same prestigious committees.  Comparing the two 
groups, Blue Dogs were severely underrepresented (with a difference of 13.6 percentage 
points) as we take a broad look at membership in any of these four committees.  This is, 
of course, during their first year as a caucus. 
 
(Table 2-I) 
104th Congress-Any Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 129/69.73 15/83.33 144/70.94 
Member 56/30.27 3/16.67 59/29.06 
Total 185/100.00 18/100.00 203/100.00 
*P-value=0.225 
 
By the time the 105th Congress has finished, the prestige-membership percentage 
of both groups had risen.  Blue Dogs had gained 0.72% inclusion in this elite committee 
system, while Non-Blue Dogs had gained 1.28% greater representation.   Blue Dogs 
remained underrepresented only a few years later, with little sign of significant increase 
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in representation to come.  Furthermore the gap between the two groups had increased to 
14.16 percentage points. 
 
(Table 2-J) 
105th Congress-Any Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 128/68.45 19/82.61 147/70.00 
Member 59/31.55 4/17.39 63/30.00 
Total 187/100.00 23/100.00 210/100.00 
*P-value=0.162 
    
In the 106th Congress, Blue Dogs could claim that 19.35% of its membership was 
a part of at least one of the most powerful committees in the House.  Non-Blue Dogs 
could declare that 31.67% of their ranks worked in the same legislative workshops.  The 
difference in percentage between these groups fell, however, to a 12.32 percentage point 
gap.  The Blue Dogs were still underrepresented when compared to their peers outside of 
the caucus, but less so than they had been in previous years. 
 
(Table 2-K) 
*P-value=0.167 
 
The 107th Congress again proved to be a year that Democrats were more a part of 
these power committees than in years past.  The 18.75% of Blue Dogs present in 
106th Congress-Any Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 123/68.33 25/80.65 148/70.14 
Member 57/31.67 6/19.35 63/29.86 
Total 180/100.00 31/100.00 212/100.00 
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Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means, or Budget were 15.69 percentage points lower 
than the 34.44% of regular Democrats present in the same group of committees.  The 
Blue Dogs remained underrepresented in the 107th Congress, relative to their counterparts 
outside the Coalition.  
 
(Table 2-L) 
*P-value=0.080 
 
The 108th Congress saw this gap between percentage of Blue Dogs and 
percentage of non-Blue Dogs on prestige committees fall drastically.  The difference 
between the two groups was reduced to 4.2 percentage points (down from 15.69), as 10 
of the 36 Blue Dogs held positions on these powerful committees.  This demonstrates an 
enormous jump in influence potential among Blue Dogs, as shown in Table 2-M. 
 
(Table 2-M) 
108th Congress-Any Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 117/68.02 26/72.22 143/68.75 
Member 55/31.98 10/27.78 65/31.25 
Total 172/100.00 36/100.00 208/100.00 
*P-value=0.621 
 
107th Congress-Any Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 118/65.56 26/81.25 144/67.92 
Member 62/34.44 6/18.75 68/32.08 
Total 180/100.00 32/100.00 212/100.00 
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 In the 109th, Blue Dogs were better represented in prestigious committees than 
their Non-BDC counterparts.  While 31.14% of regular Democrats held membership in 
one of the four power committees described above, 31.43% of the Coalition could claim 
seats in the same groups.  For the first time Blue Dogs hold a slight overrepresentation 
(of 0.29 percentage points) over the rest of their party.  Table 2-N shows the statistically 
insignificant data, with a P-value of 0.973, below: 
 
(Table 2-N) 
109th Congress-Any Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 115/68.86 24/68.57 139/68.81 
Member 52/31.14 11/31.43 63/31.19 
Total 167/100.00 35/100.00 202/100.00 
*P-value=0.973 
 
 In the 110th Congress, membership in the Blue Dog Coalition reached 43 total 
legislators out of 233 total Democrats.  Approximately 18.45% of Democrats associated 
themselves as Blue Dogs during this time.  By this time, 35.79% of the Non-Blue Dog 
majority of the Democratic Party was seated in Appropriations, Rules, Budget, or Ways 
and Means.  By contrast, 32.56% of Blue Dogs shared these seats of influence.  This 
comes to a 3.23 percentage point difference between the two groups, with the favor 
tipping slightly in favor of members outside of the caucus. 
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(Table 2-O) 
110th Congress-Any Non-Blue Dog (n/%) Blue Dog (n/%) Total (n/%) 
Not Member 122/64.21 29/67.44 151/64.81 
Member 68/35.79 14/32.56 82/35.19 
Total 190/100.00 43/100.00 233/100.00 
*P-value=0.689 
 
 Committee assignment is a primary tool of party leadership; appointments to key 
positions can be used as punitive measures as well as rewards.  The demonstration of 
Blue Dog presence at a level below that of their appropriate proportional representation 
may signal disfavor or second-class membership within the Democratic Party.  By 
excluding some Blue Dogs, the Democratic leadership has willfully allocated power to 
hands more likely to vote the party line and less likely to represent a separate and 
independent message.  Over time, however, one can observe that the Democratic 
leadership gives the BDC roughly its “fair,” and here we mean proportional, share of 
representation.  The marked rise in parity between the two groups tells a story counter to 
what one might have imagined looking at the early numbers. 
 In conclusion, my hypothesis of extra preference allocated to the Blue Dogs due 
to their position within the caucus as vulnerable and influential lawmakers is not entirely 
correct.  If anything, the Blue Dogs receive negative attention, preventing an appropriate 
representation within the most powerful committees of the House of Representatives.  
However, the divide between the two groups plummets from 13.6 percentage points 
below the proportion of Non-BDs (in the 104th) to a mere 3.23-percentage point gap (by 
the 110th). 
75 
 
 While there was no evidence in support of the hypothesis I set out, the increase in 
proportional representation over time to a level of near parity may explain a lot about the 
influence of the Blue Dogs within the Democratic Party.  I may have overstated the 
possibility of an immediate overrepresentation as compensation for the BDC, but the 
vulnerable and unique position of Blue Dogs as majority makers may have brought about 
this gradual rise in prestige committee membership towards a state of near equality 
among Blue Dogs and their partisan counterparts.  Caucuses, as the literature suggests, 
are demands for more influence in the policy making process, and in this sense, the Blue 
Dog Coalition has seen success over the last decade. 
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Question #3: Blue Dog Association With Fiscal Conservatism  
The NTU score encompasses a collection of votes indicative of conservative 
ideology, and ranks them accordingly.  The caucus’ collective score is a measure of Blue 
Dog cohesion on these issues.  With a whip system, CMO rules in place to reinforce 
when votes are obligatory, and a size cap on membership that improves personal 
exchange of ideas, caucus unity has become a core component of Blue Dog Democracy- 
the style and strategy of the BDC. 
 
Hypothesis #3: Blue Dog membership is associated with higher fiscal 
conservatism among Democrats even when other factors are controlled. 
 
Furthermore, the NTU score is already tried and proven, providing a well-respected 
constant upon which to gauge the independent effect of membership in the BDC. 
 It is important to note that there are limitations to the emphasis I have placed upon 
NTU scores in my work.  The NTU score does take into account more votes than the 
ACU scores, and the Taxpayer’s score is exclusively focused on a selection of votes that 
have a weighted range of impacts on federal budgetary issues.  That being said, using an 
interest group as your primary fiscal conservatism indicator means relying on the hand 
picked selection of votes in a given year as your primary way of discerning ideology.  
This may pose a problem if what the NTU perceives as the fiscally responsible and 
conservative choice of voting behavior is contrary to most legislators’ opinion. 
 There are a number of factors—including personal ideology, tenure in office, and 
constituency opinion-- that make a legislator fiscally conservative, but above and beyond 
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that, I hypothesize that the Blue Dog Coalition has an independent effect on fiscal 
conservatism, as recorded by the NTU scores.  In other words, is it possible that the 
caucus pulls its members in the direction of greater fiscal conservatism?  I will test this 
by running a regression analysis of the above-mentioned variables. 
In running a regression analysis, I have discovered that Blue Dogs hold an 
independent, significant predictor effect on the NTU score.  I used linear regression with 
the NTU score as the dependent variable being predicted, and several conservative 
independent predictor variables, the first of which was the Blue Dog Coalition variable to 
determine the effect the BDC has on NTU scores.  The NOMINATE score is utilized to 
measure ideology in its entire breadth of conservative-liberal on the political spectrum.    
Tenure is used to identify what relationship between conservatism and job security may 
exist below the surface of ideology debate. 
In the 104th, the 107th, the 108th, and the 109th Congress, the Blue Dogs and the 
NOMINATE score have an extremely significant effect on fiscal conservatism, as judged 
by the NTU scores.  The 110th shows the same relationship, but the NOMINATE score’s 
significance is slightly weaker than the aforementioned Congresses.  Tenure never proves 
to establish itself as an independently influential variable with regards to fiscal 
conservatism. 
The results of the 105th are fascinating in that they show an immediate drop 
(roughly 4.87 to -.04) in the coefficient of Blue Dog Coalition membership.  
Furthermore, while the effects of the BDC returned to a significant status, the 
NOMINATE score of the 106th Congress could not claim an effect on NTU scores 
independent of chance or other variables held constant. 
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The results of this test are listed in Table 3-A: 
(Table 3-A) 
Conservative Independent Variables’ Effect on NTU Score 
 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 
BDC 
4.869571 
(2.67)** 
-.0351044  
(-0.02) 
7.235064 
(4.64)** 
5.657424 
(4.50)** 
4.195772 
(5.15)** 
6.475123 
(6.11)** 
3.568492 
(4.01)** 
DW Nom. 
33.28992 
(11.08)** 
-3.069699   
(-0.79) 
3.442405 
(1.05) 
12.0564 
(4.50)** 
5.602254 
(3.03)** 
9.003439 
(3.58)** 
3.682542 
(1.66)* 
Tenure 
-.1282814     
(-1.27) 
-0.0447567 
(-0.36) 
0.0089663 
(0.07) 
0.309548 
(0.32) 
0.0684915 
(1.11) 
.0863431 
(1.08) 
-.1073089 
(-1.65) 
Constant 
45.58133 
(31.43)** 
23.6345 
(13.23)** 
24.08654 
(14.72)** 
23.16489 
(16.73)** 
19.70079 
(20.98)** 
18.49962 
(14.82)** 
10.27883 
(9.56)** 
Observations 
199 206 209 211 205 202 229 
R-squared 
0.5178 0.0047 0.1606 0.2932 0.2716 0.3355 0.1651 
 
 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
It appears that all of the independent variables, except tenure, are significant in the 
prediction of NTU scores at the 5% level.  In conclusion, the Blue Dog Coalition can be 
used to predict the NTU score, meaning membership in the BDC has a concrete impact 
on levels of fiscal conservatism.  This level of influence suggests that the fiscally 
conservative claims of Blue Dogs can be verified by the behavior of its members. 
It is important to note that, as I warned above, using an interest group score’s 
hand picked vote collection leaves the results to the whim of any year’s given selection.  
In the 105th Congress, it seems as though the collection of votes assembled by the NTU 
did not match up with preferences throughout Congress.  The fact that NOMINATE, 
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which is an all-encompassing ideological score of sort, did not achieve a level of 
significance in the 105th and 106th Congress points to the possibility of a problem with 
respect to the NTU’s key vote selection. 
Limitations of this section are exposed when discussing the influence of 
constituency influence.  As a result, I have taken into account the percentage of support, 
in a given constituency, for the Republican presidential nominee as a brief demonstration 
of this variable, which can be found below.  Unfortunately this analysis was limited to the 
results of the 107th, 109th, and 110th Congresses, but the brief overview offered below 
suggests that the presidential support variable has a significant effect on the NTU score.  
In addition, with other variables held constant, this additional constituency-based variable 
does not change the BDC variable significance and independence in its influence over 
fiscal conservatism.   
(Table 3-B) 
Effects on NTU Score, Including Presidential Support Variable 
 107 109 110 
BDC 
 5.609267 
(4.41)** 
6.116715 
(5.78)** 
3.190499 
(3.61)** 
DW Nom. 
11.49677 
(3.52)** 
5.172293 
(1.74) 
-.9424219 
(-0.36) 
Tenure 
.0287303 
(0.30) 
.07354578 
(0.93) 
-.1020915 
(-1.60) 
prezparty 
-.0107282 
(-0.30)* 
-.081513   
(-2.37)* 
-.0953726 
(-3.06)** 
Constant 
23.6154 
(11.57)** 
22.0451 
(11.36)** 
13.96083 
(8.72)** 
Observations 
211 202 229 
R-squared 0.2935 0.3539 0.1986 
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 These findings suggest that membership in the Blue Dog Coalition, apart from 
tenure, presidential party scores, and the NOMINATE ideology score, will allow 
observers to predict a higher National Taxypayers Union score.  This points to the 
extraction of the Krehbiel vs. CPG theorist debate, and the final results suggest that there 
is something unique about membership in the informal caucus institution that will 
increase fiscal conservatism.  The literature review discusses the argument of parties 
influencing personal preferences; this research has applied that argument and shown 
fascinating results on the caucus level with the above regression analysis.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Summarizing the Data 
 Blue Dogs are more conservative than the rest of the Democratic Party.  On 
average, interest group scores have shown slightly more conservative tendencies in 
members of the Coalition than in their non-Blue Dog counterparts.  They also have a 
lower rate of party unity than their peers outside of the caucus.  Their ideology score, 
which includes votes on social policy as well as fiscal, places them, on average, closer to 
the center than the Democratic Party as a whole (and in absence of Blue Dogs).   
 In most aspects, the gap between conservative Blue Dogs and their more liberal 
counterparts is closing.  BD reduction rates in NTU scores and ACU scores fell more 
quickly than those of Non-Blue Dogs.  While the Blue Dogs stay more conservative than 
the party average, changes in voting behavior signal a more cohesive Democratic 
coalition. 
 Entrance into the BDC did not correspond with a significant change in 
conservatism on most scores.  It seems the Krehbiel-minded theorists could have better 
predicted these results on a caucus scale than the CPG theorists on the whole; ACU and 
NTU scores decreased during the year of admission, rather than the predicted rise in 
conservative behavior, suggesting no effective influence was exerted upon members of 
the BDC.  Interestingly, the NOMINATE scores, which include social ideology in their 
vote collections, show a significant departure from the rest of the Democratic Party 
towards the conservative end (positive values) of the spectrum provided by Poole and 
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Rosenthal.  It is important, however, to recall that our N never exceeds 17 for Blue Dogs 
that join from a previous non-BDC position in Congress. 
 Democratic Party leadership, in the 104th, showed no positive leadership 
preference given to Blue Dogs in the form of prestige committee assignments, as I 
predicted.  On the contrary, Blue Dogs received under-representation in Ways and 
Means, Budget, Rules, and Appropriations during their early days, yet as time went on, 
the BDC members reached a state of near proportional parity with Non-Blue Dogs in 
these powerful institutions.  It seems that additional seats that accompany a newly elected 
majority in the House were not spent on loyalty, but translated into ideological 
representation and coalition preservation from which the Blue Dogs benefited. 
 Blue Dogs can also be used to predict changes in fiscal conservatism.  The 
regression analysis done at the end of Chapter 3 testifies to the strong correlation between 
fiscal conservatism and Blue Dog Democracy.  Just as percentage of support for a 
Republican presidential candidate and NOMINATE scores reflect ideological preference, 
so too does membership in the Blue Dog Coalition mark a legislator as fiscally 
conservative (in line with NTU scores).  If a member of Congress can claim membership 
in the Blue Dog Coalition, one can safely assume that their NTU score will be higher by 
the provided value in Table 3-A. 
 
Future of CMOs 
 The Blue Dog Coalition, along with other premier caucuses, has begun to change 
the rules of the game.  Many groups and individuals, the BDC included, have begun to 
frame caucuses as institutions that behave as parties within parties.  The services they 
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offer are related but much more specific to the partisan groups to which they belong, and 
this specialization offers a natural way of maintaining some sense of uniqueness in a 
Congress that grows more divided along partisan lines.  The proliferation of caucus 
institutions seems to follow an evolution in the division of congressional labor.  This 
specialization follows from the development of parties in our early history, alongside the 
construction of a sweeping committee series in the early 19th century.  It is possible that 
caucuses, in many ways, are the next step in congressional governance. 
 Centralization of party leadership in the Speaker position certainly seems to 
contradict this point at the surface level, but the Conditional Party Government theory 
presents some very valuable counterpoints to mind.  In many ways, the strengthening of 
liberal leadership is a result of greater intraparty factionalism than homogeneity.  This is 
important for three reasons. 
 First, a party that is more ideologically diverse will need outlets to represent these 
dissenting voices on smaller policy issues. Members, such as the fiscally conservative 
Blue Dogs, must be allowed to vocalize their opinions on these issues if there is to be any 
sense of security for the partisan coalition.  If legislators feel strongly enough (for 
electoral or personal reasons) about these conflicting views to ruffle the party feathers, 
the stifling of these views will have negative effects that transcend a simple sense of 
democratic propriety; under all circumstances, the inability to answer the fundamental 
question of representing the entirety of a party will jeopardize the party’s long term 
policy initiatives and future electoral prospects. 
 Second, an ideologically diverse party, if appropriately consolidated, will be a 
more powerful party.  The political tactics of the United States are unlike many of our 
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parliamentary counterparts; the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties are 
catchall campaigns that seek to maximize the breadth, rather than the depth, of party 
support.  Knowing this, the party with the widest appeal will logically emerge more 
successful.  The era of Democratic rule from 1949 to 1994 in the House of 
Representatives was in no small part due to the spread of ideological ground covered by 
southern conservative Democrats and other groups that have since converted to the 
Republican Party.  Pelosi’s strategy of distributing power proportionally to the interests 
of her party has in many ways recaptured the Democratic Party of old, while retaining 
higher party unity. 
 Third, a diverse party often strengthens leadership.  Democrats are in the same 
political boat.  There’s a collective responsibility when one runs for office under a 
partisan title that is rarely trumped by personal credentials.  The more seats won by a 
political party, the more effective their policy initiatives will be passed through the 
legislature, and so every individual Democrat has an interest in maintaining as large and 
strong of a party majority as possible.  This is a crucial point that has been raised by 
proponents of the CPG.  Diversity, as well as homogeneity, can demand stronger 
leadership to maintain a governing coalition, so long as factions threaten outcomes in a 
generally cohesive party environment. 
 I foresee caucuses, and particularly small, ideological party caucuses such as the 
BDC, as becoming an integral part of any party’s ideological integrity, so long as they 
pursue a strategy of maintaining a broad, umbrella-like ideological base.  CMOs offer a 
way for members to disagree quietly, having greater influence on legislation, within the 
system and within the umbrella of acceptable party behavior.  Caucuses satisfy many 
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needs of members who could ultimately disrupt the cohesiveness of a political party, and 
the consistent, solid Blue Dog support for the Democratic Party, even if slightly below 
the rest of the party may avoid detrimental factionalism. 
 
How Do the Blue Dogs Fit into All of This? 
The conflict of politics is unsettling to the American people, despite the direct 
responsibility they hold over the circumstances.  It has been argued that “the central 
political fact in a free society is the tremendous contagiousness of conflict,” but 
(Schattschneider 1975, 2) the cacophonous crash of ideologies at every turn of the 
lawmaking process has led to a general dislike of all the components of the democratic 
process.  While it is undeniably true that the public holds the opportunities of democracy 
dear and sacred, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue that the general love of the process is 
less certain; “what Americans want is much more difficult.  They want stealth 
democracy” (Smith, Roberts, and Vander Wielen 2009, 5).   
Furthermore, this polarization has squeezed the most extreme voices to the 
surface, so that moderates are drowned in the chaos that must ensue in such a process.  
As Brady and Theriault say, “The consensus among journalists, senators, and scholars, 
then, is that the national media pay more and more attention to less and less important” 
lawmakers in such a polarized context (Smith, Roberts, and Vander Wielen 2009, 13).  
What, then, does this mean for the attention-smothered Blue Dog Democrats and their 
claims of centrism? 
The clear perception of victors and losers allows partisan feelings to develop and 
manifest itself in a structured view of American politics, built around the two major 
86 
 
parties (Hetherington 2001, 624).  The failures of Congress become the failures of 
Democrats or the failures of Republicans, and over time, a very rigid sense of 
responsibility develops between voters and their party identification. “As people come to 
realize that Democrats and Republicans will pursue substantially different courses, 
attachment to one side or the other becomes more consequential, and party image 
becomes more salient,” and as a result, any muddling of the newly demarcated lines of 
responsibility could have drastic consequences for the relationship between 
constituencies and voters (Hetherington 2001, 627). 
Polarization creates a sense of ideological clarity that the Blue Dogs evade.  
When, “in 1990, fewer than half of Americans could even identify which party controlled 
the House, despite the fact that the Democrats had done so for nearly 40 years,” it is no 
stretch of the imagination that “two voices may only serve to confuse citizens,” and it is 
important to remember that the public is not a constant observer of American politics 
(Hetherington 2001, 625).  Much is dependent on the timing and frequency of media 
coverage of events and individuals on the Hill.  The Blue Dog Democrats, however, are 
growing in recognition and have put up some fights on some pieces of legislation on 
which the Democratic majority has staked its political livelihoods.  Suddenly, with the 
emergence of a group such as the BDC, a victory for Democrats may require clarification 
as to what types of Democrats are being discussed. 
 
Avoiding Clarity 
 Is the emergence of a party-within-a-party organization of such clout a good thing 
for democratic elections?  The much-lauded clarity that arrived hand in hand with 
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modern polarization may not be imposed upon groups that follow the Blue Dog model. 
“Elite polarization has clarified public perceptions of the parties’ ideological differences, 
which has led to a resurgence of parties in the electorate,” but what of the sub-party units 
hovering below the radar of nightly news (Hetherington 2001, 619)?  The BDC was 
formed to represent the interests of its members in an attempt to secure seats despite 
districts that could have a high chance of being contested by liberals for the Democratic 
nomination and conservative Republicans in the general election. Just as a party with 
greater ideological inclusion may have an inherent advantage in national elections due to 
the breadth of their appeal, a candidate that can appeal to a greater number of voters will 
increase his chances of reelection.    
This is the ultimate purpose of the BDC; the organization exists to increase the 
security of its members’ position as congressman by enhancing the utility, experience, 
and name recognition of its members in a favorable conservative Democratic light.  Yet if 
the Blue Dogs can campaign to their Democratic base as still being firmly on the blue 
half of the ideological spectrum while simultaneously selling themselves as a different 
brand of legislator to conservatives, clarity begins to give way to the haze of political 
rhetoric and moderate ideology.  Evasion of the collective responsibility that 
accompanies Democratic membership may be a primary incentive for Blue Dog 
candidates to join. 
The decision to label oneself as a different brand of Democrat, as a fiscal 
conservative, comes at a price.  It is too early to tell whether that price is declining along 
with transitions in power and adjustments in the approach Democratic leadership takes 
with respect to the BDC.  The decision to willfully declare oneself at odds with certain 
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pillars of Democratic philosophy has garnered hostility among the Democratic faithful, 
and while not as extreme in the level of disagreement, the dialogue is reminiscent of past 
questions raised by Democratic lawmakers considering the position of Boll Weevils.  At 
what level of low party unity and general disobedience does the value no longer outweigh 
the price of factionalism? 
This question brings to the forefront an even more important question; are the 
claims made by the Blue Dogs supported by evidence?  In my research, I’ve shown that 
in the 104th and the 110th Congress the BDC has voted more conservative than their 
counterparts, as reported by NTU scores and ATU scores, while remaining significantly 
lower than the average of non-Blue Dog Democrats in terms of party unity scores.  The 
NOMINATE scores, additionally, have proved to show that Blue Dogs are indeed more 
conservative than their counterparts on the -1 to 1 spectrum. 
 
Single-Issue Caucus? 
 The Blue Dogs have effectively picked a single issue that performs as a vector for 
all policy domains when and if they apply to the interests of the BDC membership. 
Despite this flexibility, the nominally singular nature of their purpose commits their 
organization to only the strictest interpretations of fiscal conservatism.  The budget, the 
deficit, and the debt (think blue dog democrat), are really the only issues that the BDC 
cannot avoid addressing. 
 National security is a growing component of the Blue Dog identity.  More and 
more members of the BDC have identified themselves with national security as a core 
component of their uniqueness within the Democratic Party.  Given the traditional view 
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of “tough” foreign policy as a Republican strength, this transcendence of the singular 
focus on fiscal conservatism is natural.  The occasional Blue Dog press releases, the 
website of specific members, and the commentary of journalists will include fiscal 
conservatism and a focus on national security as the defining features of the organization, 
marking a philosophical expansion of a relatively new organization. 
 More importantly, the amoebic utility of fiscal policy offers the Blue Dogs with 
their choice to virtually all-legislative opportunities.  Funding is the heart of Congress; it 
is the center of legislative debate, and the core of politics.  If politics, as an idea, is to be 
interpreted as the way in which resources are distributed in a given society, then the Blue 
Dogs have put themselves in the position of only focusing on frugal distribution.  The 
limits of their interests, following this logic, do not exist; with nearly every action in 
Congress tied to the budget, debt, and deficit, the Blue Dogs too tie themselves to the 
select cases they which to take their stand. 
 
Blue Dog Coalition as a Success Story 
 The Blue Dogs have been a success in a number of ways.  First, they have 
garnered attention to their members in ways that the Blue Dog leadership, even if it were 
willing, would probably not have been able to manage. The Blue Dog Coalition has 
utilized “the media’s well-known bias toward framing politics in terms of conflict” 
(Hetherington 2001, 622).  Whether this is a by product of their ideology or an explicit 
goal of the organization remains to be seen, but the Blue Dogs, more so than other 
caucuses of comparable congressional influence, have attracted public attention and 
notoriety for their combative stance on budget, debt, and deficit issues. 
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Self-Critique and Future Studies 
The approach of calculating change in conservatism by measuring the difference 
in variable values from the first year of BDC membership and the year prior to admission 
is not without shortcomings.  I maintain it is a relatively simple, encompassing approach 
to evaluating externally exerted pressure.  There are very few members of the Blue Dog 
Coalition who joined after serving at least one term as non-Blue Dogs.  Most members of 
the caucus join upon winning contested seats, and many of these received aid to their 
campaign from the Blue Dogs prior to their first electoral victory.  This leaves a sampling 
size of only 17. 
 In addition, the third primary research question is primarily concerned with 
addressing the validity of their claims of fiscal conservatism.  More than anywhere in my 
research, this area has suffered from time constraints.  It would prove fruitful to continue 
this line of thought in a number of similar, refined directions.   
 My initial proposal included an evaluation of discrepancies between the roll call 
vote and the more closed doors counts on rules and regulations within the party.  This 
was as promising a topic as any other I addressed, and without it, the story of the Blue 
Dog Coalition is incomplete.  Closed door votes on rules allows the opportunity for 
protecting vulnerable legislators by crafting favorable conditions that would allow or not 
allow certain amendments to force a decision upon a party membership.  The Blue Dogs, 
with their collection of conservatives, could easily fall victim to forced attention on 
abortion, guns rights, and a variety of other issues not explicitly part of the BDC platform, 
but nonetheless included in the general makeup of its membership.  Similarly, Speaker 
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Pelosi and other Democratic leaders might create conditions that allow the BDC to voice 
public opposition, protecting an identity of staunch fiscal conservatism, while pressuring 
closed-door votes that all but secure the leadership-favored outcome.  None of this is 
supported with concrete evidence in my work and should be addressed in future research. 
 Vulnerable membership, itself, is something that defines many caucus members in 
general and the Blue Dog Coalition in particular.  The centrism of their claimed 
philosophy has placed them in the cross hairs of Democratic challengers and Republican 
contestants alike.  However, the extent to which this circumstance brought about the 
BDC and maintains a factor in the necessity of the Coalition’s services has not been 
supported with empirical evidence here.  A look at electoral numbers from both primary 
and Republican challengers should be an important next step in evaluating the Coalition. 
 An examination of Blue Dogs and the circumstances of their primary position is 
yet another fascinating, essential piece of the puzzle I’ve begun to assemble, and without 
it, my work falls short of my initial goals.  “As the threat of a serious primary opponent 
increases, so the argument goes, members cast increasingly ideological votes;” the 
assumed correlation between pragmatism and moderates on one hand and extremism and 
ideologues on the other is worth applying to the case of Blue Dogs (Theriault 2008, 50). 
 Furthermore, a look at the Blue Dog ranks is worth the time and attention of 
scholars beyond my own capacity.  If Krehbiel maintains that parties have less influence 
on the organization of legislative activity than is commonly perceived, it would be 
interesting to observe party unity scores of co-chairs of the BDC at various points in time.  
If nothing else, this may offer some kind of insight as to the focus of the caucus.  Do 
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leaders reward loyalty (as can be shown by party unity scores), fund raising, or diversity 
as a part of their strategy? 
 All in all, there is a wealth of data ready to be analyzed on the way in which Blue 
Dogs behave.  Testing on caucus unity with regard to non-fiscal issues (gun rights, 
abortion, national security policy, etc.), the cohesion of the BDC as a result of the caucus 
whip system and mandatory voting regulations, and analysis on closed doors rules votes 
should be made a priority to continue the work I have begun here. 
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Appendices: Rosters of the Blue Dog Coalition (by Congress) 
 
 
Congress Name State District 
104 BAESLER, SCOTTY  KENTUCK 6 
104 BREWSTER, BILL   OKLAHOM 3 
104 BROWDER, GLEN    ALABAMA 3 
104 CONDIT, GARY     CALIFOR 18 
104 CRAMER, BUD      ALABAMA 5 
104 DANNER, PAT      MISSOUR 6 
104 GREEN, GENE      TEXAS   29 
104 HALL, RALPH M.   TEXAS   4 
104 LAMBERT, BLANCHE ARKANSA 1 
104 LIPINSKI, WILLIA ILLINOI 3 
104 MINGE, DAVID     MINNESO 2 
104 ORTON, BILL      UTAH    3 
104 PAYNE, L.F.      VIRGINI 5 
104 PETERSON, COLLIN MINNESO 7 
104 PICKETT, OWEN B  VIRGINI 2 
104 STENHOLM, CHARLE TEXAS   17 
104 TANNER, JOHN     TENNESS 8 
104 TAYLOR, GENE     MISSISS 5 
 
Source:  (“Moderate-To-Conservative” 1995)
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Congress Name State District 
105 BAESLER, SCOTTY  KENTUCK 6 
105 BERRY, MARION    ARKANSA 1 
105 BISHOP, SANFORD  GEORGIA 2 
105 BOYD, ALLEN      FLORIDA 2 
105 CONDIT, GARY A.  CALIFOR 18 
105 CRAMER, ROBERT E ALABAMA 5 
105 DANNER, PAT      MISSOUR 6 
105 GOODE, VIRGIL H. VIRGINI 5 
105 HALL, RALPH M.   TEXAS   4 
105 HOLDEN, TIM      PENNSYL 6 
105 JOHN, CHRISTOPHE LOUISIA 7 
105 LIPINSKI, WILLIA ILLINOI 3 
105 MCINTYRE, MIKE   NORTH C 7 
105 MINGE, DAVID     MINNESO 2 
105 PETERSON, COLLIN MINNESO 7 
105 PICKETT, OWEN B  VIRGINI 2 
105 SANDLIN, MAX     TEXAS   1 
105 SISISKY, NORMAN  VIRGINI 4 
105 STENHOLM, CHARLE TEXAS   17 
105 TANNER, JOHN S.  TENNESS 8 
105 TAUSCHER, ELLEN  CALIFOR 10 
105 TAYLOR, GENE     MISSISS 5 
105 TURNER, JIM      TEXAS   2 
 
Source: (“The ‘Blue Dog’ Roster” 1997)
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Congress Name State District 
106 BERRY            ARKANSA 1 
106 BISHOP           GEORGIA 2 
106 BOSWELL          IOWA    3 
106 BOYD             FLORIDA 2 
106 CARSON           INDIANA 10 
106 CONDIT           CALIFOR 18 
106 CRAMER           ALABAMA 5 
106 DANNER           MISSOUR 6 
106 FORD             TENNESS 9 
106 GOODE            VIRGINI 5 
106 HALL  RALPH      TEXAS   4 
106 HILL  BARON      INDIANA 9 
106 HOLDEN           PENNSYL 6 
106 JOHN             LOUISIA 7 
106 LIPINSKI         ILLINOI 3 
106 LUCAS  KEN       KENTUCK 4 
106 MCINTYRE         NORTH C 7 
106 MINGE            MINNESO 2 
106 MOORE  DENN      KANSAS  3 
106 PETERSON  C      MINNESO 7 
106 PHELPS  DAV      ILLINOI 19 
106 PICKETT          VIRGINI 2 
106 SANCHEZ          CALIFOR 46 
106 SANDLIN          TEXAS   1 
106 SHOWS  RONN      MISSISS 4 
106 SISISKY          VIRGINI 4 
106 STENHOLM         TEXAS   17 
106 TANNER           TENNESS 8 
106 TAUSCHER         CALIFOR 10 
106 THOMPSON  M      CALIFOR 1 
106 TURNER           TEXAS   2 
 
Source: (“The ‘Blue Dog’ Roster” 1999)
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Congress Name State District 
107 BACA  JOE   CALIFOR 42 
107 BERRY       ARKANSA 1 
107 BISHOP      GEORGIA 2 
107 BOSWELL     IOWA    3 
107 BOYD        FLORIDA 2 
107 CARSON      OKLAHOM 2 
107 CRAMER      ALABAMA 5 
107 FORD        TENNESS 9 
107 HALL  RALPH TEXAS   4 
107 HARMAN      CALIFOR 36 
107 HILL  BARON INDIANA 9 
107 HOLDEN      PENNSYL 6 
107 ISRAEL      NEW YOR 2 
107 JOHN        LOUISIA 7 
107 LIPINSKI    ILLINOI 3 
107 LUCAS  KEN  KENTUCK 4 
107 MATHESON    UTAH    2 
107 MCINTYRE    NORTH C 7 
107 MOORE  DENN KANSAS  3 
107 PETERSON  C MINNESO 7 
107 PHELPS  DAV ILLINOI 19 
107 ROSS        ARKANSA 4 
107 SANCHEZ     CALIFOR 46 
107 SANDLIN     TEXAS   1 
107 SCHIFF      CALIFOR 27 
107 SHOWS  RONN MISSISS 4 
107 STENHOLM    TEXAS   17 
107 TANNER      TENNESS 8 
107 TAUSCHER    CALIFOR 10 
107 TAYLOR  GEN MISSISS 5 
107 THOMPSON  M CALIFOR 1 
107 TURNER      TEXAS   2 
 
Source: (“107th Congress” 2002)
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Source: (Hawkings and Nittag 2004, 1140)
Congress Name State District 
108 ALEXANDER        LOUISIA 5 
108 BACA             CALIFOR 43 
108 BERRY            ARKANSA 1 
108 BISHOP           GEORGIA 2 
108 BOSWELL          IOWA    3 
108 BOYD             FLORIDA 2 
108 CARDOZA          CALIFOR 18 
108 CARSON           OKLAHOM 2 
108 CRAMER           ALABAMA 5 
108 DAVIS            TENNESS 4 
108 FORD             TENNESS 9 
108 HALL             TEXAS   4 
108 HARMAN           CALIFOR 36 
108 HILL             INDIANA 9 
108 HOLDEN           PENNSYL 17 
108 ISRAEL           NEW YOR 2 
108 JOHN             LOUISIA 7 
108 LIPINSKI         ILLINOI 3 
108 LUCAS            KENTUCK 4 
108 MATHESON         UTAH    2 
108 MCINTYRE         NORTH C 7 
108 MICHAUD          MAINE   2 
108 MOORE            KANSAS  3 
108 PETERSON         MINNESO 7 
108 POMEROY          NORTH D 1 
108 ROSS             ARKANSA 4 
108 SANCHEZ          CALIFOR 47 
108 SANDLIN          TEXAS   1 
108 SCHIFF           CALIFOR 29 
108 SCOTT            GEORGIA 13 
108 STENHOLM         TEXAS   17 
108 TANNER           TENNESS 8 
108 TAUSCHER         CALIFOR 10 
108 TAYLOR           MISSISS 4 
108 THOMPSON         CALIFOR 1 
108 TURNER           TEXAS   2 
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Congress Name State District 
109 BACA             CALIFOR 43 
109 BARROW           GEORGIA 12 
109 BERRY            ARKANSA 1 
109 BISHOP           GEORGIA 2 
109 BOREN            OKLAHOM 2 
109 BOSWELL          IOWA    3 
109 BOYD             FLORIDA 2 
109 CARDOZA          CALIFOR 18 
109 CASE             HAWAII  2 
109 CHANDLER         KENTUCK 6 
109 COOPER           TENNESS 5 
109 COSTA            CALIFOR 20 
109 CRAMER           ALABAMA 5 
109 DAVIS            TENNESS 4 
109 FORD             TENNESS 9 
109 HARMAN           CALIFOR 36 
109 HERSETH          SOUTH D 1 
109 HOLDEN           PENNSYL 17 
109 ISRAEL           NEW YOR 2 
109 MATHESON         UTAH    2 
109 MCINTYRE         NORTH C 7 
109 MELANCON         LOUISIA 3 
109 MICHAUD          MAINE   2 
109 MOORE            KANSAS  3 
109 PETERSON         MINNESO 7 
109 POMEROY          NORTH D 1 
109 ROSS             ARKANSA 4 
109 SALAZAR          COLORAD 3 
109 SANCHEZ          CALIFOR 47 
109 SCHIFF           CALIFOR 29 
109 SCOTT            GEORGIA 13 
109 TANNER           TENNESS 8 
109 TAUSCHER         CALIFOR 10 
109 TAYLOR           MISSISS 4 
109 THOMPSON         CALIFOR 1 
 
Source: (Koszczuk and Stern 2005, 1160)
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Congress Name State District 
110 ARCURI      NEW YOR 24 
110 BACA        CALIFOR 43 
110 BARROW      GEORGIA 12 
110 BEAN        ILLINOI 8 
110 BERRY       ARKANSA 1 
110 BISHOP      GEORGIA 2 
110 BOREN       OKLAHOM 2 
110 BOSWELL     IOWA    3 
110 BOYD        FLORIDA 2 
110 CARDOZA     CALIFOR 18 
110 CHANDLER    KENTUCK 6 
110 COOPER      TENNESS 5 
110 COSTA       CALIFOR 20 
110 CRAMER      ALABAMA 5 
110 DAVIS       TENNESS 4 
110 DONNELLY    INDIANA 2 
110 ELLSWORTH   INDIANA 8 
110 GILLIBRAND  NEW YOR 20 
110 HARMAN      CALIFOR 36 
110 HERSETH     SOUTH D 1 
110 HILL        INDIANA 9 
110 HOLDEN      PENNSYL 17 
110 ISRAEL      NEW YOR 2 
110 MAHONEY     FLORIDA 16 
110 MARSHALL    GEORGIA 8 
110 MATHESON    UTAH    2 
110 MCINTYRE    NORTH C 7 
110 MELANCON    LOUISIA 3 
110 MICHAUD     MAINE   2 
110 MOORE       KANSAS  3 
110 MURPHY      PENNSYL 8 
110 PETERSON    MINNESO 7 
110 POMEROY     NORTH D 1 
110 ROSS        ARKANSA 4 
110 SALAZAR     COLORAD 3 
110 SANCHEZ     CALIFOR 47 
110 SCHIFF      CALIFOR 29 
110 SCOTT       GEORGIA 13 
110 SHULER      NORTH C 11 
110 TANNER      TENNESS 8 
110 TAYLOR      MISSISS 4 
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110 THOMPSON    CALIFOR 1 
110 WILSON      OHIO    6 
 
Source: (Koszczuk and Angle 2007) 
